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This study extends the value-relevance research on the association between the 
cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures. Using the ex ante measures of 
the cost of equity capital and a hand-developed index measure of the level of segment 
disclosures, this study finds that the theoretical negative association between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the existing probability 
of informed trade. This study also finds mixed evidence in support of the contention that 
the negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures is increasing (decreasing) in the absence (presence) of managerial 
blockholdings. Further, the increasing effect of probability of informed trade dominates 
the decreasing effect of the presence of managerial blockholdings. Overall, evidence 
suggests that the negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
segment disclosures is increasing in the probability of informed trade and absence of 
managerial blockholdings.  
 Theory predicts a negative association between the cost of equity capital and the 
level of financial disclosures of the firm. A higher level of disclosure leads to a reduction 
of information asymmetry between managers and investors which results in the reduction 
of cost of equity capital of the firm. However, the evidence in favor of a negative 




The objective of this study is to examine factors that may affect the relationship 
between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure level of the firm. Specifically, this study 
identifies and tests two factors which may affect the theoretical negativ  relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure – information asymmetry among 
different types of investors, and information asymmetry between managers and investors 
(shirking behavior of managers). 
 Disclosures reduce information asymmetry existing between managers nd investors 
and hence, reduce the cost of equity capital of the firm. The negative association between the 
cost of equity capital and disclosures, because of a reduction in information asymmetr  
between managers and investors, may also be dependent on a second type of informatio  
asymmetry that exists between different types of investors (e.g., well informed vs. less-
informed investors, domestic vs. foreign investors, etc.).  The direction and strength of 
association between this type of information asymmetry and the level of disclosure could 
affect the overall association between the cost of equity capital and disclosures. The first 
research question in this study specifically addresses the effect of informati n asymmetry 
that exists among different types of investors on the overall association between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of disclosure.  
 The second research question studies the effect of managerial blockholdings on the 
association between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure of the firm. 
Separation of ownership and control results in agency problems between managers d 
owners (shareholders). Alignment of interests of managers and shareholders helps educe the 
agency problem. Therefore, the severity of the agency problem decreases with an increase in 




blockholding can affect the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
disclosure. It can make it stronger by reducing the moral hazard (agency) problem whereby 
the managers of the firm may engage in shirking behavior. The moral hazard problem may 
reduce the reliance of investors on the financial disclosure of the firm. However, it may also 
make it weaker if increased managerial blockholdings affect the quality of disclosures 
adversely. Increased managerial blockholdings may result in more managed earnings and 
reduce the quality of disclosures.  
 The third research question looks at the combined effect of the information 
asymmetry existing among different type of investors and the managerial blockholdings on 
the association between cost of equity capital and disclosures.  
 This study uses segment disclosures provided by US firms to examine the three 
research questions. Sample firms have enough variation using the hand-developed measure 
of the level of segment disclosure. Bens and Monahan (2004) find that quality of segment 
disclosure as measured by segment information disaggregation is a good proxy of overall 
quality of disclosure. The examination of segment disclosures by itself adds to the literature 
emphasizing the importance of segment disclosure regulations in place (e.g., SFAS # 131 and 
IFRS 8). 
 This study contributes towards the information asymmetry literature which until 
recently has concentrated on the information asymmetry between managers and investors 
(principal-agent) ignoring the information asymmetry that may exist among different types of 
investors. Another contribution of this study is towards the disclosure literature which
predicts a negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure. 




explain this mixed evidence by examining two additional factors (probability of nformed 
trade and managerial ownership) that may affect the relationship between the cost of equity 
capital and the level of disclosure. This study also contributes to the literature on segment 
disclosure. Only one study (Bens and Monahan, 2004) examines the association betwee  the 
market valuation of the firm and the level of segment disclosure. The drawback of the study 
by Bens and Monahan (2004) lies in the measure of the quality of segment disclosure which 
only looks at one aspect of the segment disclosure, namely, degree of segregation. In this 
study, I develop a measure of the level of segment disclosures based on hand collected data 
which is a more comprehensive measure and covers several different aspects of sgment 
disclosure.   
It is important to understand the association between the cost of equity capital and the 
level of disclosure in order to understand how investors process reported segment 
information in the presence of different types of information asymmetries and different 
fundamental factors while evaluating a firm. Also, it is important to understand the 
importance of the managerial blockholdings in controlling the shirking behavior of the 
managers (agents) and how it affects the value relevance of the disclosed inf rmation. This 
research also provides relevant information for testing the effectiveness of segment 
information provided by firms under SFAS # 131 (US-GAAP) as well the effectiveness of 
IFRS 8 of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In 2006, IASB adopted 
IFRS 8 for segment reporting by international firms which is quite similar to SFAS # 131 of 
US-GAAP in defining operating segments.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews prior 




disclosures. Chapter III discusses the hypotheses development for the study. Chapter IV 
describes the sample data and research methodology to test the hypotheses. Chaptr V 
provides and discusses the results of analyses followed by the concluding chapter. Ap endix 
A discusses development of the measure of the level of segment disclosure based on hand 








2.1 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry occurs when one group of participants has better or 
timelier information than other groups (Copeland et al., 2005). Two types of information 
asymmetry are discussed in prior literature – one, between managers of the firm and the 
investors, and two, between the investors themselves (e.g. well informed vs. less 
informed, domestic vs. foreign investors, or institutional investors vs. individual).  
The first type of information asymmetry is often the result of principal-agent 
conflicts (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lambert, 2001). Managers of the firm possess 
superior information about the firm’s prospects over the investors of the firm. This lead  
to the problem of adverse selection faced by the investors (e.g. Akerlof, 1970; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). This may also lead to a moral hazard problem whereby the managers may 
not always work in the best interest of the shareholders. Firms use corporate governance 
mechanisms to check this type of information asymmetry.  
The second type of information asymmetry (information asymmetry among 
different types of investors) has received less attention in the literatur. The source of this 
kind of information asymmetry is private information possessed by a group of well-




asymmetry among investors could arise because of the ability of a group of sophisticated 
investors to process publicly available information into private information signal (e.g. 
Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Information asymmetry may also be the result of selectiv  
disclosures of material information made by the firms to a group of investors (usually 
large and institutional investors) before others (usually small and individual investors). 
To mitigate the practice of selective disclosure, the SEC passed Regulation F ir 
Disclosure (RegFD) in Fall 2000. However, there is no regulatory mechanism in place to 
reduce the probability of informed trade by sophisticated investors whereby such 
investors can process the publicly available information to their advantage.  
 
2.2 Cost of Equity Capital.  
The cost of equity capital can be defined as the expected rate of return of the 
current and prospective equity shareholders. It is the return demanded by the equity 
shareholders to bear the risks associated with the firm which in turn affects sto k prices. 
As a firm becomes riskier, the investors demand a higher return resulting in a higher cost 
of equity capital.  
Various firm characteristics are associated with the firm’s risk, eturn, and cost of 
equity capital. Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) show that average stock 
returns are related to overall market returns, firm size, and book-to-market equity. Basu 
(1983) documents the relation between stock returns and earnings yield. Bhandari (1988) 
documents a relationship between stock returns and the debt-to-equity ratio. Fama and 
French (1996) call these factors “asset pricing anomalies” because these patterns in 




developed by Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965). According to the CAPM, expected returns 
(or cost of equity capital) are linearly related only to the systematic risk of the firm.  
A wide body of literature uses average realized returns as a proxy for expected 
returns or in other words, proxy for the cost of equity capital. Being an ex post measure 
of returns, average realized returns are a poor proxy of the cost of equity capital (e.g. 
Gebhart et al., 2001; and Botosan, 1997). CAPM based models represent alternative 
estimation methods for determining the cost of equity captial. However, risk premia 
calculations in CAPM models are still based on the past realized returns and hence 
provide an imprecise measure of the cost of equity capital (Gebhart et al., 2001) 
Due to problems with the models based on ex post measures of returns, implied 
cost of equity capital (internal rate of return) estimation has gained recent attention. Such 
estimation methods use discounted cash flows (payoffs) to infer the implied cost of
equity capital. These methods are known as residual income models or dividend discount 
models often referred to as Edward Bell Ohlson (EBO) models developed by Edwards 
and Bell (1961), and Feltham and Ohlson (1995). Several variants of the EBO model 
have been used in recent studies to calculate the cost of equity capital (e.g. Botosan, 
1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003). 
These models vary in their definition of residual income and calculation of the terminal 
value used in the model. Botosan (1997) uses the EBO valuation model equating market 
price of a firm’s stock to the sum of expected dividends discounted at the cost of equity 
capital. Frankel and Lee (1998) implement the EBO model using analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for expected income.  Gebhardt et al. (2001) use expected future cash flows in 




(2003) model, and the Claus and Thomas (2001) model are other commonly used 
versions of EBO model. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) assess different alternative proxes
for the expected risk premium. They find that risk premiums calculated using the target 
price method (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) and using the price earnings growth (PEG) 
ratio method (Easton, 2004) are consistently and predictably related to risk while other 
alternatives were not. Under the target price method, an infinite series of future cash 
flows in an EBO model is truncated at the end of year five by inserting a forecasted 
terminal value. Under the PEG ratio method, the risk calculation is based on the ratio of 
long-run earnings’ forecasts (as opposed to short-term earnings forecast in E o , 2004) 
and initial price.    
This study uses four alternative EBO models and a fifth, as an arithmetic average 
of the four, to calculate the ex-ante cost of equity capital for reasons discussed above. 
These models are discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Major results of the study are based 
on the average measure. 
 
2.3 Association between Financial Disclosure, Information Asymmetry and Cost of 
Equity Capital 
 Theory suggests a positive relation between information asymmetry and the 
firm’s cost of equity capital because investor’s perceived risk of the firm (beta) increases 
in asymmetric information and vice versa (e.g. Barry and Brown, 1985; Handa and Linn, 
1993; Coles et al., 1995; Hubbard, 1998). Finance and accounting literature posits that 
information disclosures reduce information asymmetry, improve shareholder welfa e, and 




1985; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Habib, 2006).  
Various reasons have been cited in the research for the reduction in the cost of 
equity capital with an increase in financial disclosure. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
show that revealing public information reduces information asymmetry in general, 
increases liquidity in the market, and hence increases demand from large investors of the 
firm’s securities which reduces the firm’s cost of equity capital. Welker (1995) concludes 
that uninformed investors price protect against potential losses resulting from adverse 
selection which influences the bid-ask spread (a proxy for cost of equity capital). He 
predicts an inverse relation between bid-ask spread and disclosure policy and a positive 
relation between spread and the proportion of trade coming from informed traders. 
Callahan et al. (1997) conclude that improvement in the information environment of 
firms through better disclosure reduces transaction costs, and hence the cost of equity 
capital. Thus, “the disclosure policy of a firm serves as a mechanism that can mitigate 
information asymmetry and lower firms’ cost of external financing” (Francis et al., 
2005).  
Financial disclosures of a firm are defined as the mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures made by the managers of the firm regarding the firm’s financial performance 
in order to help investors evaluate the firm for making investment decisions. Many 
studies on financial disclosure consider voluntary disclosures only (e.g. Verrecchia, 1983; 
Meek et al., 1995; Francis et al., 2008; Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) while 
others consider the level of overall disclosure (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 




Some association studies on disclosures look at the quality of disclosures rather 
than the level of disclosure. Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) conclude that information 
quality affects firms’ future cash flows lowering the cost of capital. Byard and Shaw 
(2003) find that the precision of analysts’ forecasts increases in the quality of d scl sures. 
In an international study, Hail and Leuz (2006) conclude that countries with a better 
information environment have a significantly lower cost of equity capital. Sengupta 
(1998) concludes that firms with higher disclosure quality have a lower cost of debt. He 
refers to the quality of disclosures as the degree of detail and clarity in annual d 
quarterly reports, accessibility of top management for discussion, frequency of press 
releases, and timeliness of the disclosure. For the purpose of this paper, quality of 
segment disclosure is defined as the amount or the level of segment disclosure 
(mandatory and voluntary) provided by the firm in their 10-K filings with the SEC.  
Another stream of literature looks at the value relevance of specific disclosures 
such as intangibles and R&D activities of a firm (e.g. Aboody and Lev, 1998; Gu and 
Lev, 2004). In general, they find that the investors use the specific disclosures about 
intangibles and R&D activities in evaluating the firm.  
Accounting literature has also focused on the value relevance of segment and 
geographic disclosures (pre- and post- SFAS # 131) of multinational corporations 
(MNCs). Berger and Hann (2003) find that the market values the newly revealed segment 
information post-SFAS # 131 and the new information also improves the monitoring of 
the firm. Consistent with the monitoring role of segment information post-SFAS # 131, 
Hope and Thomas (2008) conclude that voluntary geographic earnings disclosures post-




Ettredge et al. (2005) conclude that SFAS # 131 increased both the quantity and quality 
of segment disclosure by examining the relation between segment disclosure and th
forward earnings’ response coefficient. Hossain (2008) finds an increase in value 
relevance of the quarterly foreign sales data post-SFAS # 131. Hope et al. (2008) find 
that mispricing of foreign earnings (documented as the foreign earnings anomaly by 
Thomas, 1999) lessens post-SFAS # 131. Hope et al. (2009) find that disclosure of 
foreign earnings under SFAS #131 is priced by the investors and is associated with firm’s 
information environment. Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that segment disclosure 
under SFAS #131 improves the information environment of the firm as suggested by the 
increased reliability of analysts on public data post-SFAS # 131. Behn et al. (2002) find 
that geographic segment information under SFAS #131 is more informative and useful to 
analysts as evidenced by reduced forecast errors. Nichols et al. (1995) also find 
improvement in forecast accuracy of analysts after the disclosure of geographic segment 
information post-SFAS # 14. Overall, evidence on segment disclosure suggests that 
segment disclosure help improve the analysts’ forecasts and investors’ overall 
information by improving information environment of the firm. 
 Contrary to theory, empirical research also provides some evidence of a positive 
relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002; Bushee and Noe, 2000).  Botosan and Plumlee (2002) conclude that cost of equity 
capital increases with more timely disclosures (quarterly disclosures) possibly through 
increased stock volatility. Bushee and Noe (2000) conclude that increased disclosure 




increase stock return volatility or in other words, increases ex-post cost of equity rather 
than decrease it.  
The relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosures is also likely a 
function of management and disclosure credibility. Frost (1997) finds a weaker stock 
price reaction to disclosures issued by financially distressed U.K. firms as compared to 
non-distressed U.K. firms suggesting that investors are sensitive to the incentives of 
management when assessing the credibility of disclosures (Mercer, 2004). According to 
Mercer (2004), managers have greater incentives to provide overly positive disclosures 
than overly negative disclosures. Gao (2008) provides a theoretical explanation for the 
mixed empirical relation between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure quality by 
introducing the investment effect of disclosure. He analytically shows that the cost of 
equity capital could increase with disclosure when the adjustment cost of new investment 
is sufficiently low and the prior expected profitability of existing investment is 
sufficiently high. Adjustment cost refers to the cost that the firm may incurbecause of 
new investment decisions. For example, if Microsoft Inc. and Google Inc. are planning 
on investing in Yahoo Inc. then the adjustment cost of new investment in Yahoo is higher 
for Microsoft than for Google because Yahoo’s business model is much closer to 
Google’s than to Microsoft’s. Lower adjustment cost provides incentives to the 
management to invest in subpar projects and hence may adversely affect the amount and 
the credibility of disclosures provided by the management. Similarly, Lambert et al. 
(2007) analytically show that disclosure quality can change a firm’s real decisions, which 




cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. They call this the indir ct 
effect of disclosure on the cost of capital.  
 Theory predicts an optimal disclosure policy for the firm which is determined by 
the trade-off between reduced information asymmetry (reduced cost of capital) nd the 
increased cost of information disclosures. These information costs could be due to 
litigation costs (Skinner, 1997), and proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Hayesand 
Lundholm, 1996) of disclosing the information. Therefore, higher disclosures reduce cost 
of equity but not always. There exists an optimal amount of disclosures which is 
endogenously determined for each firm (Core, 2001).  
 Another stream of literature tries to explain the mixed results of assocition 
between the cost of equity capital and disclosure. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) attribute 
the mixed results on the relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure to 
the already rich information environment under US-GAAP. They suggest that the 
negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure holds strongly in a 
poor information environment. In contrast, Cheng et al. (2006) attribute a stronger 
negative relation between the cost of equity capital and disclosure to an interaction effect 
between disclosures and a strong shareholder rights regime. In particular, hey find that 
firms with stronger shareholder rights and higher levels of financial disclosures are 
associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. Similarly, Francis et al. (2008) 
conclude that the negative relation between the cost of capital and the voluntary 
disclosures fades away after controlling for quality of earnings. They sugge t a mediation 
effect of voluntary disclosures whereby voluntary disclosures increase in earn gs quality 




between information quality and the cost of equity capital by breaking down the overall 
information uncertainty into public and private information precision using the Barron et 
al. (1998) model popularly known as the BKLS model (e.g. Botosan et al., 2004). 
Botosan et al. (2004) find a negative relation between the cost of equity capital and the 
precision of public information which is offset by a positive relation between the cost of 
equity capital and the precision of private information. The drawback of these studies lies 
in their dependence on the BKLS model for separating the overall disclosure qualityinto 
public and private information precision. The BKLS model focuses exclusively on the 
public and private information environment of financial analysts rather than investors. 
Similarly, Easley et al. (2002) find a strong positive relation between private information 
precision and the cost of equity capital. They use a private information-based tr ding 
(PIN) measure to measure the private information. PIN is a more comprehensive measure 
compared to the BKLS model as it is based on the information environment of all the 
investors in general. PIN measure is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Using the PIN 
measure, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find that disclosure quality reduces informati n 
asymmetry by reducing the likelihood that investors search for private informati n and 
trade on it. Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b) study the influence of precision (quality) 
of public information on information asymmetry, price, and volume of trade in the 
market. They analytically prove that the precision of public information affects the 
incentives for investors to acquire private information, and thereby affects the 





 Overall, theory supported by analytical research and the empirical evidence 
suggests that the relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure 
is not unidirectional. In general, theory predicts an inverse relationship between the two, 
but under some special circumstances, this negative relationship may be mitigated (non-
significant) or may even be positive. The objective of the current study is to provide 
empirical evidence in support of the above mentioned theory and further determine the 
special circumstances when the negative relationship between the cost of equiy and the 
level of disclosure is significant (non-significant).  
This study uses the level of segment disclosure post-SFAS # 131 to test the 
theory. Segment disclosure is a small yet important part of the overall financial disclosure 
of the firm. If the results of the study hold well using the level of segment disclosure then 
we expect to have even stronger results when using the overall level of financial 
disclosure. In other words, the results using the level of segment disclosure can be 
generalized for the level of overall financial disclosures. As mentioned earlier, the reason 
for using the level of segment disclosure in this study is that no study has directly 
examined the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 








Until recently, prior literature has mostly concentrated on the role of public 
information only. Theory predicts that the level of public disclosures reduces informati n 
asymmetry and a reduction in information asymmetry results in a reduction in the cost of 
equity capital. But empirical evidence is mixed on the effect of disclosure on the cost of 
equity capital of the firm.  
Recent studies look at the role of private information along with the role of public 
information. Studies, using the BKLS model to separate information precision into public 
and private information precision, suggest that the effects of disclosure on the cost of 
equity capital are mixed because of the contrasting roles of public and private 
information (Botosan et al. 2004). However, Easley et al. (2002) use a different approach 
to measure the private information precision and empirically find that stocks with higher 
probabilities of information-based trading (a proxy for high private information 
precision) have higher rates of return.  
This study makes an attempt to distinguish between the two kinds of information 
asymmetries, study the relationship of the two information asymmetries with the level of 
disclosure, and their effect on the cost of equity capital of the firm. The two types of 




hereafter) whereby some investors are better informed than other investors, and (2) 
principal-agent information asymmetry (Type II hereafter) whereby managers (agents) 
have superior information over shareholders (principal). Type I information symmetry 
leads to a problem of adverse selection whereby uninformed investors incur losses with 
respect to informed investors because well informed investors may possess private 
signals that less informed investors do not. On the other hand, Type II information 
asymmetry leads to a problem of moral hazard whereby the managers could engage in 
selfish behavior. To study the effect of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital, one 
needs to observe the effect of disclosure on the two types of prevailing information 
asymmetries. Level of disclosure, in general, reduces information asymmetry but results 
may be stronger in a poor information environment as evidenced by Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) and Botosan (1997). But we do not know if similar results hold when we 
separately examine Type I and Type II information asymmetry.  
The effect of the level of disclosures on Type I information asymmetry is context 
specific because of differing roles of public and private information, and the presence of 
different types of investors. Higher disclosure levels may or may not resultin the 
reduction of Type I information asymmetry. Institutional investors are better abl  to 
produce a superior assessment of firm’s financial performance based on the available 
public information than individual investors can. For example, Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994) find that informed market participants (such as analysts or large shareholders) 
process public information into private information to generate an information advantge 
over their relatively uninformed counterparts. Hence, a public signal can further increase 




individual investors. An increase in Type I information asymmetry may result in higher 
returns (ex ante) demanded by the investors in general. Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
analytically show that investors demand a higher return (ex ante) to hold stocks with 
greater private information. On the other hand, increased amount of disclosure may 
actually help reduce the Type I information asymmetry, which may exist as a result of 
limited amount of disclosure, among different types of investors. Limited amount of 
disclosure may provide an opportunity to the sophisticated institutional investors to gain
an informational advantage over individual investors and provides incentives for 
information processing leading to higher information asymmetry among the two types of 
investors. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) conclude that disclosures reduce the likelihood of 
information processing and information based trading by sophisticated investors. 
 From above discussion it can be hypothesized that disclosures are more effective 
in reducing the cost of equity capital when the likelihood of information based trading 
(Type I information asymmetry) is higher. The negative relationship between the cost of 
equity capital and level of disclosure may be dependent on prevailing Type I information 
asymmetry. Or in other words, the negative association between the cost of equiy capital 
and the level of disclosures may be stronger when Type I information asymmetry or the 
likelihood of information based trading is high. Using a special case of segment 
disclosures, the first hypothesis can be stated as: 
 
H1: The negative relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 





This study specifically uses segment disclosures provided by the US firms under 
SFAS # 131 instead of more general overall disclosure. The reason is that no study (to he 
best of my knowledge) has directly examined the association between the cost of equi y 
capital and segment disclosure. However, Bens and Monahan (2004) find a positive 
association between the excess value of diversification (ex post) and disclosure quality 
for multi-segment firms. If the results hold in favor of H1 using the level of segment 
disclosure then it would hold for the level of overall disclosure too, since segment 
disclosure is a small yet important part of overall disclosure of the firm. 
 Theory predicts that the cost of equity capital is increasing in probability of 
managerial shirking behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Alignment of interests of 
owners and managers may affect the real decisions made by the managers. Manager of a 
firm with low or no managerial ownership is more likely to make decisions in favor of a 
new investment even if the marginal profitability of the new project is low or the risks 
associated with the new investment project are high (i.e. empire building). The actions 
taken by the managers may not always be in the best interest of the shareholders 
encouraging the shirking behavior by the managers.  This is the moral hazard problem 
(e.g. Holmstrom 1979, Jensen and Smith 1985, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987) referred 
to earlier as Type II information asymmetry. Bebchuk and Stole (1993) analytically show 
that in absence of monitoring, managers may undertake subpar investment projectsif 
they believe that such decisions will be rewarded with high stock returns in the short-
term. Hope and Thomas (2008) find that in absence of monitoring, managers invest in 




Theoretically, managerial ownership of stock helps reduce the moral hazard 
problem by aligning the interests of managers with those of the shareholders (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). As a result managers take on value enhancing projects 
which improves firm performance and hence reduce the cost of equity capital. But the 
evidence so far has been mixed. Some studies find a positive relation between managerial 
ownership and firm performance (e.g. Morck et al. 1988; Core and Larcker 2002) while 
others do not find a significant relation between the two (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; 
Demsetz and Villalonga 2001; Cheung et al. 2006).  
A positive association between managerial ownership and firm value indicates 
that the firms with low (high) managerial ownership will have higher (lower) cost of 
equity capital. A firm with low managerial ownership (higher managerial shirking) may 
use disclosures as remedial measure to reduce the higher returns demanded by the 
investors. Prior literature finds evidence supporting a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and level of disclosures. Baek et al. (2009) find a negative 
association between managerial ownership and the level of discretionary disclosures. 
Gelb (2000) also finds that firms with lower managerial ownership are more likely to 
have higher disclosure ratings. As a result, the negative association between the cost of 
equity capital and disclosures is increasing in reduced managerial blockholdings. 
However, the firms with better aligned interests of managers and owners (increased 
managerial blockholdings) may not experience this increasing effect on the negative 
association between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosures. This is 




managers and owners), the costs of providing higher level and quality of disclosures may 
be higher than the benefits accruing from it.  
The following hypothesis tests this idea and could provide an alternative 
explanation for the mixed relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
disclosure. Therefore, hypothesis two can be stated as: 
 
 H2: The negative relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures is decreasing (increasing) in high (low) managerial blockholdings. 
(Assuming the decreasing effect of managerial blockholding on the association) 
 
This study also tests the following joint hypothesis based on H1 and H2. Segment 
disclosure may be more effective in poor investor information environment (H1) and 
when the interests of managers and owners are not properly aligned (H2). Thus, the 
stronger negative association between the cost of equity capital and disclosure, when 
probability of information based trading is high, is mitigated in the presence of 
managerial blockholdings (i.e., when probability of managerial shirking is low). Or in
other words, the interaction effect of the level of segment disclosures and probability of 
informed trade in reducing the cost of equity capital is mitigated when managerial 
blockholdings are present. Formally H3 can be stated as: 
 
H3:The negative association between the cost of equity capital and the interaction effect 
of the level of segment disclosures and probability of informed based trading is 





Earlier theory predicts a negative relationship between the cost of equity capital 
and the level of disclosure while empirically the evidence has been mixed. The above 
three hypotheses predict and test the strength of this theoretical negative relationship 
under certain situations.  The next chapter describes the research methodology and 






VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Variable Measurements 
4.1.1 Level of Segment Disclosure  
In 1997, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 131, 
Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related information, of US-GAAP 
replaced SFAS # 14 issued in 1976. Under the new regulation, multi-segment firms were 
required to report information about operating segments in their financial statements as 
the primary segments.  Operating segments for this purpose are defined as the segments 
of financial reporting used by managers of the firm for making business decisions. 
Industry and geographic segment classifications not reported as operating segments are 
reported under secondary segment information.  
This study uses three different measures to measure the level of segment 
disclosures. The first measure of the level of segment disclosures is developed based on 
hand collected data. In order to evaluate the segment disclosures provided in the 10-K 
filings, a comprehensive score of segment disclosures is developed based on the 
mandatory and voluntary segment information disclosed by the firms in their 10-K 
filings. The objective of the segment disclosure score (SDSCORE) is to provide cross- 




filings. Appendix A shows development and validation of the measure, SDSCORE. 
Primary results of this study are based on the first measure of segment disclosures 
(SDSCORE). For comparison purposes, a second measure based on Bens and Monahan 
(2004) is also used in the analysis. They use a measure of segment information 
disaggregation, DISAGG, as a measure of disclosure quality. This measure of information 
disaggregation was initially used by Piotroski (2003) and Berger and Hann (2003). 
DISAGG equals the natural log of the ratio of the number of reported segments to the 
number of reported business activities. 
   	#   #     
The number of reported segment equals the number of operating segments 
reported by the firm in the annual financial statements as per Compustat Segment 
database. The number of business activities equals the number of two-digit SIC codes in 
which the firm operates as per the L xisNexis Corporate Affiliations – U.S. Public 
Companies. DISAGG provides an objective measure of segment disclosures and 
measures the extent to which operating activities are reported separately. On  
disadvantage of using this measure of segment disclosures is that it ignores the content of 
segment disclosures made by the firm under SFAS # 131 and only focuses on one aspect 
of segment information – number of reported operating segments. It also ignores the 
segment information provided under the secondary segment information (if any). Bens 
and Monahan (2004) also point out that DISAGG provide no information about the 
underlying precision of the information disclosed and that DISAGG will be lower for 




Data for the variable DISAGG is then winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent level 
to avoid the effect of outliers in the data. DISAGG is used as a second proxy of the level 
of segment disclosures in the analysis.  
This study also uses a third measure of the level of segment disclosures 
(WORDS). According to this measure, level of segment disclosures is defined as the 
natural log of the number of words used in reporting segment information under SFAS 
131 disclosures provided by the firm.  
WORDS = ln(# of words) 
where, 
# of words = number of words used in reporting segment information under SFAS # 131 
disclosures made by the firm in 10-K filings. 
Data for the variable WORDS is then winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent level 
to avoid the effect of outliers. WORDS is used as the third proxy of the level of segment 
disclosures. 
 
4.1.2 Probability of information-based trading (PIN) 
Hypothesis 1 and 3 require a proxy to measure the information asymmetry among 
different types of investors (type II information asymmetry). This is measured using the 
probability of information-based trading (PIN) for a given firm-year, which is based on 
the EKO model developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997). EKO model is widely 
used in market microstructure literature in finance to proxy for information based trading. 
For a detailed discussion of this measure see Easley et al. (1997, 2002). PIN measure 




trades. The model assumes that private information events occur at the beginning of the 
trading day with probability α. The private information contains “bad” news with 
probability δ and “good” news with probability (1 – δ). Bad (good) news signals that a 
profit maximizing trade is to sell (buy) the stock. Buy and sell orders from traders arrive 
according to Poisson processes throughout each trading day. Orders from risk-neutral and 
competitive informed traders arrive at rate µ on information event days (good or bad 
news days), orders from uninformed buyers arrive at rate εb, and orders from uninformed 
sellers arrive at rate εs on any trading day. Informed traders buy if they know good news 
and sell if they know bad news. Figure 1 illustrates the tree diagram of the trading 
process as per Easley et al. (2002). 
-----------Insert Figure 1from Page 74 right about here----------- 
Assuming the Poisson process, the likelihood function induced by trade process 
on a single trading day is: 
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where, 
B  =  total buy trades for the day; 
S  =  total sell trades for the day; 
θ  =  (α, µ, εb, εs, δ) is the parameter vector. 
Thus, likelihood function across I trading days is 
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(Bi, Si) is trade data for day i = 1,…, I and K = ((B1, S1),…,(BI, SI)) is the data set. 
Estimates for parameters of model (α, µ, εb, εs, δ) are estimated by maximizing (2) over θ 
given the data K. Using these parameters (i.e. α, µ, εb, εs), PIN can be estimated using, 
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The numerator in the formula for PIN represents the expected number of orders 
from privately-informed investors and the denominator represents the expected number
of total orders each day. Thus, PIN represents the expected fraction of trades that are 
information-based. Equation 3 shows that the probability of information-based trading is 
increasing in private information events (α) and more informed trading (µ), and 
decreasing in uninformed trading (εb and εs).  
 Estimating PIN empirically requires estimation of parameter vector θ. To estimate 
θ, the daily numbers of buy and sell orders for 12 months during 2005 for each firm is 
required. Trade orders data is collected from Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database with a 
minimum of 30 days trading data required for each firm. Each trade is classified as buyer-
initiated or seller-initiated using Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready, 1991). This 
algorithm uses current bid and ask quotes to determine trade direction. Buy (sell) trad s 
are more likely to be executed at or near ask (bid). Therefore, trade that takes pl ce above 
(below) the midpoint of the current quoted spread is classified as a buy (sell). Trades 
taking place at midpoint are classified using “tick test” based on the price of th most 
recent transaction. Following Hasbrouck (1988), all trades occurring within five seconds 




Parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood function in equation (2) 
and assuming that the daily arrival rate of uninformed buy orders is equal to the daily 
arrival rate of sell orders, i.e., εb = εs = ε. As a result of this assumption, equation (3) can 
be rewritten as, 
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PIN is calculated by using the resulting parameter estimates from estiation of 
likelihood function in equation (4). Data for variable PIN is then winsorized at the 5 
percent and 95 percent level to avoid outliers. For maintaining the normality and linearity 
of the data, following natural log transformation of PIN is used in the analysis. Thus, 
LPIN =  ln (PIN) 
Variable LPIN is used as a measure of probability of informed trading in the 
analysis to study the association between the cost of equity capital and he level of 
segment disclosures. Value of PIN, as a measure of probability, lies between 0 and 1. 
Natural log of values between 0 and 1 is negative. Therefore, the value of LPIN is 
negative for all observations. Lower negative value of LPIN corresponds to a higher 
probability of informed trading while higher negative value of LPIN corresponds to a 
lower probability of informed trading. For example, PIN = 0.8 corresponds to LPIN = -
0.22 and PIN = 0.2 corresponds to LPIN = -1.61. Probability of informed trade is higher 
for PIN = 0.8 as compared to PIN = 0.2. Therefore, LPIN = -0.22 (mathematically larger) 
as compared to LPIN = -1.61 (mathematically smaller) corresponds to a higher 
probability of information based trading. There is a significantly high positive (approx. 
97%) correlation between PIN and LPIN. High probability of informed trading 




cost of equity capital. Therefore, LPIN is expected to be positively associated with the 
cost of equity capital.  
  
4.1.3 Managerial blockholdings 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 require a dummy variable for managerial blockholdings to 
control for the managerial ownership as a proxy for managerial shirking behavior. If the 
interests of managers and owners are aligned then managers would avoid shirking 
behavior and avoid investing in inefficient projects. Lafond and Rowchowdhury (2008) 
conclude that accounting conservatism is decreasing in managerial ownership indicating 
a reduction in agency problem with an increase in managerial ownership. Presence of 
managerial blockholdings (higher managerial ownership) corresponds to reduced shirking 
behavior of the managers. Dummy variable NOBLOCK indicates the absence of 
managerial blockholdings in the sample firm. NOBLOCK is equal to zero if the firm has 
manager(s) with more than 4 percent stock ownership in the firm and equal to one if no 
manager has more than 4 percent ownership.1  
 
4.1.4 Implied cost of equity capital (ex ante) 
 This study estimates ex ante cost of equity capital implied by analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and stock prices. Five alternative proxies of implied cost of equity cap al are 
calculated. The first four proxies are - (1) RGLS based on Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001) model; (2) RGM based on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model (2005) as 
implemented by Gode and Mohanram (2003); (3) RCT based on the Claus and Thomas 
                                                          
1 Managers in some firms own more than 4 percent but less than 5 percent stock to avoid being included in 




(2001) model; and (4) RPEG based on the Easton (2004) model. There is no consensus in 
the literature as to which model performs the best in measuring implied cost of equity. To 
mitigate the measurement error associated with one particular model, a fifth proxy (RAVG) 
of the cost of equity capital is calculated as an arithmetic average of above four proxies. 
All four models are variants of the dividend-discount model or EBO residual income 
model. The dividend discount model can be written as (Botosan and Plumlee 2005): 
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where: 
P0  =  price at time t = 0 (at the beginning of the year 2006); 
r  =  estimated cost of equity capital; 
E0(.)  =  the expectations operator; and 
dpst  =  dividends per share. 
Using the clean surplus accounting, equation (5.1) can be converted to the 
residual income model: 
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where, 
Et[.]   =  the expectations operator at time t; 
NIt  =  net income for the period t; 
Bt  =  book value at time t;
Other variables are defined as before. 






Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) Model, RGLS 
This model developed by Gebhardt et al. (2001), GLS hereafter, uses a 12-year 
forecast horizon. The resulting model is shown below in equation (6). 
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where, 
FROEt  =  forecasted return on equity for period t equals  
VWX0Y+YZ[  for periods t = 1,2, 
and 3. FEPSt is the earnings per share forecast for year t. FEPS1 and 
FEPS2 are IBES analysts’ one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per 
share forecast. FEPS3 equals FEPS2 times one plus IBES analysts’ 
consensus long-term growth forecast. When the long-term growth forecast 
is not available in IBES then long-term growth forecast is calculated as 
(FEPS2 – FEPS1) – 1. FROE4 to FROE12 are calculated using linear 
interpolation to industry median ROE using the procedure in GLS.  
b0  =  book value per share in year t = 0 calculated as book value at the 
beginning of the year divided by number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the year;  
bt = year t book value divided by number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the year t. Using clean surplus accounting, Bt  = Bt-1 + FEPSt 
+ FDPSt. FEPS is forecasted earnings per share from the IBES database. 




dividend payout ratio. For periods t = 4 to 12, FEPS is calculated using 
FROE in the formula FROEt = (FEPSt/ bt-1) 
RGLS   =  estimated cost of equity capital; and 
P0  =  as defined earlier. 
 Following GLS (2001), this estimate assumes that each firm’s ROE reverts to 
industry median ROE in a linear fashion over periods 4 through 12. Firms are divided 
into 48 industries based on the Fama and French (1997) classification. Industry median 
ROE equals ten-year median ROE for all firms (excluding the firms with negative 
income) within the same industry. FROE for periods 4 through 12 is calculated using this 
industry median ROE. FROE value thus obtained can be used to calculate FEPS for 
periods 4 through 12 as explained above.  
 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) implementation of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth Model, 
RGM 
Gode and Mohanram (2003), GM hereafter, estimate implied cost of equity 
capital using the following implementation of Ohlson-Juettner model (Equation 7 below). 
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g2  =  short-term growth rate that equals IBES long-term growth forecast where 




DPSt+1  =  Forecasted dividend per share for year t+1, calculated as FEPSt+1 times 
year t dividend payout ratio; 
FEPSt+1  =  IBES analyst one-year ahead earnings per share forecast; 
r f = the risk-free rate, equal to the yield on ten year US treasury bond; 
RGM = implied cost of equity capital as per GM model. 
 A major assumption of this model is that short-term growth rate (g2) decays to 
the risk-free rate minus three percent (r f – 0.03) perpetually. 
 
Claus and Thomas (2001) model 
Claus and Thomas (2001) model, hereafter CT, is similar to the GLS model 
except that it assumes that the abnormal earnings after five years grow at a long term 
growth rate of (1 + glt) in perpetuity. Mathematically, the model can be stated as in 
equation (8) below. 
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where, 
RCT  =  estimated cost of equity capital as per CT model; 
glt = long-term abnormal earnings growth rate beyond year five in future, equal 
to ten-year US treasury bonds yield minus three percent. 
FEPS, b, and P are as defined earlier. 
[FEPSi – RCT(bi-1)] represents the abnormal earnings for period i. 
A major assumption for this model is that after year five in future, abnormal 





Easton (2004) modified PEG ratio method 
Under this method, the implied cost of equity capital is estimated using Easton 
(2004) modified PEG ratio model (Equation 9 below). 
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where, 
P0  =  as defined earlier; 
RPEG  =  estimated cost of equity capital;  
DPS1 = dividends per share for year 1 as defined earlier; and 
FEPSt  =  forecasted earnings per share in year t as defined earlier. 
Estimating this model requires FEPS2 to be greater than FEPS1. 
 
4.2 Model Specifications 
Hypotheses 1 tests the effect of the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures given the probability of information-based trading. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 
states that when the probability of information-based trading is high, the negative 
association between between the cost of equity capital and the level of discl sures will be 
stronger. The probability of informed trading (PIN) is measured using the EKO model.  
The following three models are used to test hypothesis 1. Model 1.1 uses a subjective 
measure of segment disclosures (SDSCORE) based on the segment disclosures provided 
by the firm under SFAS 131 disclosures in 10-K filings. Model 1.2 uses an objective 
measure of segment disclosures (DISAGG) based on the disaggregation of segment 




(WORDS) based on the number of words used in segment disclosures provided by the 
firm under SFAS 131 disclosures. All these variables have been discussed in detail in 
earlier sections.  
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where, 
Ri  =  cost of equity capital of firm i  for the year t, 
Control_Variablesi  = variables other than the level of segment disclosures 
which may affect cost of equity (discussed in detail in 
next section) of firm i, 
LPINi  =  Variable indicating the natural log of the variable PIN as 
calculated using EKO model for firm i, and 
SDSCOREi  =  Rank corresponding to the level of segment disclosures 




DISAGGi  =  Measure of the level of segment disclosures based on 
segment information disaggregation for firm i as 
discussed earlier, 
WORDSi = Natural log of number of words (WORDS) used under 
SFAS # 131 disclosures. 
 Hypothesis 2 tests the association between the cost of equity capital and the level 
of segment disclosures in the presence of managerial blockholdings. As discussed earlier, 
managerial blockholdings (NOBLOCK) is an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
managerial blockholdings are present and equal to 0 in the absence of managerial 
blockholdings. Model (2) is used to test Hypothesis 2.  
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where, 
NOBLOCKi  =  indicator variable with value equal to 1 if managerial blockholding(s) 
is present and equal to 0 if there is no managerial blockholding for the 
sample firm. 
All other variables are same as defined earlier. 
Hypothesis 3 tests hypotheses 1 and 2 together and tests the significance of the 
three-way interaction between the level of segment disclosures, the probability of 
informed trade, and the managerial blockholding. In other words, hypothesis 3 tests if the 
probability of informed trade and managerial blockholdings jointly affect the negativ  




is tested using the following two models. Model (3.1) only tests the significance of th
three-way interaction between the three variables of interest while ignorin  the two-way 
interactions. Model (3.2) is an all encompassing model which tests the significance of 
two-way as well as three-way interactions together. If the three-way interaction is not 
significant in Model (3.2), then Model (3.3) excludes the three-way interaction from all 
encompassing model. Model (3.3) tests the two-way interactions only between 
SDSCORE and LPIN, and between SDSCORE and NOBLOCK. 
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All variables are the same as defined earlier. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
Based on prior literature, this study incorporates nine control variables that may 
affect the association between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure. Thes  
variables are – firm size, returns on assets, market beta, market-to-book value of equity 
ratio, sales growth, firm leverage, analyst following, industry, and stock return volatility. 
 
4.3.1 Firm size 
The proxy for firm size (SIZE) is defined as the natural log of market value of 
equity (Compustat item # 199 * # 25) at the end of fiscal year 2005. It captures the 
differences in firm value between large and small firms. Prior reseach h s documented a 
lower cost of equity capital for larger firms (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Cheng et al., 2006). Therefore, a negative association 
between the cost of equity capital and SIZE is expected. 
 
4.3.2 Return on assets 
Return on assets (ROA) is used as a proxy for firm performance. ROA is defined 
as the ratio of income before extraordinary items (data item # 18) scaled by total assets 
(data item # 6) of the firm at the end of fiscal year 2005. Firms with better performance 
tend to have lower cost of equity capital. Therefore, ROA is expected to have a negative 





4.3.3 Market beta 
Market beta (BETA) proxies for the market risk and is calculated from a market model 
using daily stock returns over the 12 month period during 2005. Prior research has 
documented a positive association between the cost of equity capital and market bet 
(e.g. Botosan, 1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Cheng et al., 2006). Firms with increased 
market risk tend to have higher cost of equity capital. Therefore, BETA is expected to 
have a positive coefficient. 
 
4.3.4 Book-to-market ratio 
Book-to-market ratio (LBM) controls for the growth opportunities of the firm. 
LBM is measured as the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity (# 60) to market 
value of equity (# 199 * # 25) at the end of fiscal year 2005. A high LBM corresponds to 
fewer growth opportunities. Prior research reports that firms with fewer growth 
opportunities have higher cost of equity capital (e.g. Fama and French, 1995; Gebhardt t 
al., 2001; Cheng et al., 2006). Hence, LBM is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
 
4.3.5 Sales growth 
 Sales growth (SG) is used as a second proxy of firm growth. SGis measured as 
the mean of growth in sales (#12) during last two fiscal years (2004 and 2005). Firms 
with higher SG are expected to have better growth opportunities and hence, lower cost of 
equity capital. On the other hand Cheng et al. (2006) predict a positive association 
between firm’s growth variable and the cost of equity capital. Therefor, n  prediction is 




4.3.6 Firm leverage 
 Firm leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of debt (# 9 + # 34) to market value 
of equity at the end of the fiscal year 2005. Cost of equity capital increases with increase 
in leverage. Higher debt in capital structure (higher leverage) of the firm indicates greater 
credit risk of the firm thereby, increasing the cost of capital. Prior resea ch has found a 
positive association between the cost of equity and leverage (e.g. Botosan, 1997; 
Gebhardt et al., 2001; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Therefore, LEV is expected to have a 
positive coefficient. 
 
4.3.7 Analyst following 
Analyst following (FOLLOW) proxies for the information environment of the 
firm. FOLLOW is an indicator variable with value equal to 1 when number of analysts 
following the sample firm is greater than the median number of analysts following for all 
sample firms during the year 2005 as per IBES analysts’ database. Firm’s information 
environment may affect its disclosure practices and the firm value. Firms with better 
information environment are expected to have a lower cost of equity capital because of 




INDUSTRY variable is used in analysis to control for the industry effects on the 




risks. Firms in low risk industries bear higher valuation than high risk industries. 
INDUSTRY is measured as the three-digit SIC code of the firm.  
 
4.3.9 Volatility of stock returns 
Volatility of stock returns may affect the cost of equity (Bushee and Noe, 2000). 
Higher volatility of stock returns corresponds to higher risk and thereby, increases the 
cost of equity capital. Therefore, STDRET is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
Volatility of stock returns (STDRET) is measured as the natural log of mean of the annual 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over a period of five years using CRSP database.  
STDRET  =  log(mean_STDRET) 
where, 
mean_STDRET  = ∑        #g9;<  
  
The next chapter describes the sample and the data used for analyses and presents 






DATA AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Sample and Data 
 
 The sample consists of December fiscal year end firms listed in the US during the 
year 2005 that have all the required accounting and returns data needed for estimation of 
models in this study. Therefore, the initial sample includes firms listed on Compustat’s 
annual database, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily returns file, 
IBES detail database, and industry segment data available on Compustat’s industry 
segment file. Following Botosan (1997), firms in manufacturing industries with SIC in 
3312-3399, 3411-3499, 3511-3599, and 3610-3649 are included. This results in a sample 
consisting of 101 firms for the year 2005. As a result of missing data for estimating the 
implied cost of equity capital, the final sample consists of 84 firms. Implied cost of equity 
capital is calculated using 5 different measures as discussed in Chapter IV. To control the 
endogeneity in the analysis, there is one period lag between dependent and independent 
variables. Thus, implied cost of equity is estimated for the year 2006 while all the
independent variables are calculated based on the data for the fiscal year 2005. The 
sample period is chosen to conduct the study during post-SFAS-131, post RegFD, and 
post-SOX period. Data for the study are obtained from Compustat Annual, Compustat 




Table 1 provides the distribution of all the variables used in analysis. Comparing 
RGLS, RGM, RCT, and RPEG, reveals that RGM (mean value approximately 11%) and RPEG 
(mean value approximately 12%) estimate the implied cost of equity capital higher than 
RGLS (mean value approximately 8%) and RCT (mean value approximately 9%). The mean 
value of implied cost of equity based on arithmetic mean of the four measures, RAVG, is 
approximately 10%. An average firm has a SDSCORE of 0.83. Mean DISAGG value is 
1.38 and mean value of WORDS is 6.26. An average firm has a 14.3% probability of 
informed trading based on the EKO model. This corresponds to a mean value of -2.048 
for the variable LPIN. An average firm earns 7.5% return on its assets and has a sales 
growth approximately equal to 23%. Market risk of an average firm is 1.43 as measured 
by BETA. An average firm has a book to market value ratio (LBM)of -1.01. An average 
firm has approximately 23% debt to market value of equity and approximately 8 analysts 
following the firm. Median number of analysts following a firm is 6. Mean stock 
volatility (STDRET) over a five year period is -3.64 for an average firm.  
---------- Insert Table 1 from Page 86 right about here ---------- 
 Table 2 below provides Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
between five different measures of implied cost of equity capital. Pearson correlation 
method uses raw data while Spearman correlation (nonparametric) method uses rank . 
All the correlations are significant at 1% level. All four alternative measures of implied 
cost of equity capital are strongly (more than 66%) and significantly (p-value less than 
0.01) correlated to the average measure (RAVG). Correlation of RGLS with RGM and RPEG is 
less than 50 percent while all other correlations are stronger and greater than 50 percent. 




Comparative results using other alternatives are provided and discussed wherever 
necessary but the main results of the study are concluded based on RAVG as a measure of 
implied cost of equity capital. 
---------- Insert Table 2 from Page 88 right about here ---------- 
 Table 3 shows correlation coefficients (both Pearson and Spearman) between 
different explanatory variables used in the analyses in this study. The results are 
discussed based on Pearson correlation coefficients, though the Spearman correlation 
results are also consistent. There is a large and significant correlation of -0.48 between 
size of the firm (SIZE) and the probability of informed trade (LPIN) confirming the 
results from prior research that larger firms have lower probability of information based 
trading (Easley et al., 2002). LPIN is positively and significantly correlated (0.27) with 
LBM indicating that firms with lower growth opportunities tend to have a higher 
probability of informed trading. There is significant negative correlation (-0.31) between 
LPIN and FOLLOW confirming that firms with better information environment have a 
lower probability of informed trading. There is a significant positive correlation (0.29) 
between LPIN and NOBLOCK indicating that presence of higher managerial 
blockholdings results in increased probability of informed trade. It is noteworthy that on 
one hand, managerial blockholdings increase the information asymmetry among the 
shareholders (current as well as future) by increasing the probability of information-based 
trading while on the other hand, it reduces the information asymmetry between managers 
(agents) and shareholders (owners) by aligning their interests. There is a significant 
negative correlation between SIZE and LBM (-0.21) confirming that smaller (larger) firms 




correlation (0.64) between SIZE and FOLLOW confirming the results from prior research 
that larger firms tend to have a larger analyst follwing. A significantly positive 
correlation (0.38) between SIZE and SDSCORE indicates that larger firms tend to have a 
higher level of segment disclosures. Smaller firms tend to have a higher volatility of 
stock returns as indicated by a significantly negative correlation (-0.46) between SIZE 
and STDRET. Sample firms with higher returns on assets (ROA) are significantly and 
negatively correlated to LBM (-0.31) and LEV (-0.55) indicating that firms with better 
returns have higher valuation in a market and have lower debt in their capital structure. 
There is a significantly large positive correlation (0.32) between BETA and STDRET 
indicating that riskier firms have a higher volatility of stock returns. There is a significant 
negative correlation (-0.21) between STDRET and FOLLOW indicating that firms with 
better analyst following have lesser volatility of stock returns and tend to be less risky. A 
significant negative correlation (-0.30) between SDSCORE and STDRET indicates that 
firms with a higher level of segment disclosures have lesser volatility of stock returns and 
tend be less risky. A significant negative correlation (0.38) between NOBLOCK and SIZE 
indicates that larger firms tend to have low (or no) managerial blockholdings. Firms w th 
managerial blockholdings tend to attract lesser number of analysts as indicated by a 
significant negative correlation between NOBLOCK and FOLLOW (-0.32). 
---------- Insert Table 3 from Page 89 right about here ---------- 
 Table 4 shows correlation coefficients for all five alternatives of implied cost of 
equity capital with all the explanatory variables used in the study. Note that the 
correlation coefficient between the implied cost of equity capital and the level of s gment 




consistent for DISAGG and WORDS as a measure of the level of segment disclosures. 
The correlation coefficients are significant only for RPEG as the measure of implied cost 
of equity capital. There is a strong positive correlation (greater than 25%) of LPIN with 
RAVG, RCT, and RPEG indicating that firms with a higher probability of informed trade have 
higher implied cost of equity capital. Though insignificantly, RGLS and RGM are also 
positively correlated to LPIN. There is significant and strong negative correlation of SIZE 
with RAVG, RCT, and RPEG. SIZE is also negatively (insignificantly) correlated with RGLS 
and RGM. This indicates that larger firms have lower cost of equity capital. Similarly, 
there is a strong negative correlation between implied cost of equity capital and return on 
assets. There is a positive correlation (significant for RGLS and RCT) between implied cost 
of equity capital and LBM confirming the results from prior research that firms with 
fewer growth opportunities have higher cost of equity capital. Firms with higher amount 
of debt in their capital structure have higher cost of equity capital as indicate  by a strong 
positive correlation between the cost of equity capital alternatives (RAVG, RGM, RCT, and 
RPEG) and LEV. Similarly riskier firms with higher volatility of stock returns have higher 
cost of equity capital as indicated by a strong positive correlation between th  cost of 
equity capital alternatives (RAVG, RGM, RCT, and RPEG) and STDRET. 
---------- Insert Table 4 from Page 90 right about here ---------- 
Correlation between three different measures of the level of segment disclosures 
is discussed in detail in Appendix A. Variable SDSCORE is used in further analyses as a 
proxy for the level of segment disclosures. Comparative results using other alternative 
proxies are also provided and discussed wherever necessary but main results of the study 




5.2 Analyses and results 
 In this section, the results of cross-sectional analyses are reported that investigate 
how the level of segment disclosure relate to the cost of equity capital in the presence of 
information asymmetry among different type of shareholders as well as informati n 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. This section is divided into three 
subsections. The first section examines the role of information asymmetry among
different types of shareholders (as measured by probability of information-based trading) 
on the relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures 
addressing H1. Section two discusses the role of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders on the relation between the cost of equity capital and the evel
of segment disclosures addressing H2. Finally, I examine the role of the two information 
asymmetries together on the relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
segment disclosures addressing H3.  
 
5.2.1 Effect of the probability of informed trade on the association between the cost 
of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures 
 Models 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 examine the effect of probability of informed trading on 
the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures. 
The three models use three different proxies of the level of segment disclosures. Model 
1.1 uses SDSCORE, Model 1.2 uses DISAGG, and Model 1.3 uses WORDS as a measure 
of the level of segment disclosures. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the results of Models 1.1, 
1.2, and 1.3 respectively. The main results of this study are based on Model 1.1 which 




hand-collected SFAS # 131 data of sample firms. Results for Models 1.2 and 1.3 are 
presented for comparison purposes.  
 Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for Model 1.1 using RAVG as a measure of 
the implied cost of equity capital and SDSCORE as a proxy of the level of segment 
disclosures. Column 1, 2, and 3 presents the results for the model excluding the 
interaction effect of SDSCORE and LPIN. Column 1 includes SDSCORE main effect 
only, column 2 includes LPIN main effect only, and column 3 includes main effects of 
SDSCORE and LPIN both. These results show that neither main effect is significant 
although the main effect of LPIN is nearly significant. Both main effects have the 
expected sign. SDSCORE is negatively related to RAVG confirming the theoretical 
prediction that higher level of segment disclosures reduces cost of equity capital. 
Similarly, LPIN is positively related to RAVG indicating that cost of equity capital is 
increasing in information asymmetry. The Wald test of equality of the main effects of 
SDSCORE and LPIN in column 3 shows that the two main effects are not very different. 
This result suggests that the positive main effect of LPIN (0.012) is offset by the negative 
main effect of SDSCORE (-0.004) when the interaction effect is not included in the 
model. Column 4 provides results for the model including main effects of SDSCORE and 
LPIN along with the interaction effect of (SDSCORE * LPIN). Results show that the two 
main effects (SDSCORE and LPIN) as well as the interaction effect (SDSCORE * LPIN) 
are all significant and have the expected association with the cost of equity capital. The 
coefficient on SDSCORE is -0.086 indicating that the cost of equity capital is decreasing 
in the level of segment disclosures. Similarly, the coefficient on LPIN is 0.049 




of informed trade. The interaction effect of SDSCORE and LPIN is also significant and 
has a coefficient of -0.041 indicating that the negative effect of the level of s gment 
disclosures (SDSCORE) on the cost of equity capital is higher when the probability of 
informed trade (LPIN) is high. This is an interesting result which helps us understand the 
previously evidenced mixed association between the cost of equity capital and 
disclosures. This result is in agreement with prior research (e.g. Botosan 1997) which 
predicts a stronger negative association between the cost of equity capital and disclosures 
for the firms with weaker information environment. However, this result is based on the 
private information environment of the firm as against the overall information 
environment. Results of the Wald test in column 4 indicate that there is a significant 
difference between the two main effects of SDSCORE and LPIN. Negative effect of 
SDSCORE is stronger than the positive effect of LPIN on the cost of equity capital. The 
Wald statistic testing the significance of the summed coefficients of main effect of 
SDSCORE and the interaction effect of SDSCORE and LPIN (βSDSCORE + βSDSCORE * LPIN) 
indicates that the sum is reliably negative and nearly significant (p-value = 0.137). This 
confirms that the negative association of the cost of equity capital and the level of 
segment disclosures (SDSCORE) is increasing in the probability of informed trade 
(LPIN). The Wald statistic testing the significance of the summed coefficients of the main 
effect of LPIN and the interaction effect of SDSCORE and LPIN (βLPIN + βSDSCORE * LPIN) 
indicates that the sum is reliably negative and significant (p-value = 0.041). This 
confirms that the positive relation of the cost of equity capital with the probability of 




The other explanatory variables have the expected signs except the SIZE. The 
coefficients on SIZE are very small in magnitude and highly insignificant. LEV is 
consistently positive and significant in all the four columns indicating that firms with 
higher debt portion have a higher cost of equity capital as a result of increased credit risk. 
LBM and BETA are consistently positive and significant (nearly significant in column 1) 
indicating that the lower valued firms and the firms with increased market ris  have a 
higher cost of equity capital.  
 Panel B of Table 5 shows the results for Model 1.1 using the other four 
alternatives of the implied cost of equity capital (RGLS, RGM, RCT, and RPEG). Results are 
consistent for the main effects and the interaction effects as predicted except the 
significance levels. Results using RGM as a proxy for implied cost of equity capital show 
significant main effects of SDSCORE (coeff. = -0.170, p-value = 0.008) and LPIN (coeff. 
= 0.085, p-value = 0.005), and a significant interaction effect of SDSCORE and LPIN 
(coeff. = -0.075, p-value = 0.015). The Wald test statistics for the two summed 
coefficients were also significant using RGM as a proxy of the implied cost of equity 
capital confirming that negative association between the cost of equity cap al and the 
level of segment disclosures is increasing in the probability of informed trade and the 
positive association between the cost of equity capital and the probability of informed 
trade is decreasing in the level of segment disclosures.  
---------- Insert Table 5 from Page 91 right about here ---------- 
 Table 6 shows the regression results for Model 1.2 using DISAGG as a proxy of 
the level of segment disclosures and RAVG as a proxy of the implied cost of equity capital. 




column 4 include the main effects as well as the interaction effects of DISAGG and LPIN. 
The results are similar to the results obtained for Model 1.1. Coefficients on DISAGG are 
negative as predicted in columns 1, 3, and 4 but not significant. Coefficients on LPIN are 
nearly significant in columns 2 and 3 but not in column 4. The coefficient on the 
interaction effect of DISAGG and LPIN in column 4 is negative but not significant. None 
of the Wald statistics are significant. Thus, the results using DISAGG as a proxy of the 
level of segment disclosures have the coefficients with the expected signs on the 
variables of interest but none of the coefficients are significant in the model. It can be 
concluded that results are consistent with Model 1.1 but not significant. The reason for 
insignificant results could be that DISAGG may not be a good proxy for the level of 
segment disclosures. DISAGG might only be measuring the level of vertical integration 
of the firm rather than the level of segment disclosures.  
---------- Insert Table 6 from Page 93 right about here ---------- 
 Table 7 provides the regression results for Model 1.3 using WORDS as a proxy of 
the level of segment disclosures and RAVG as the proxy of the implied cost of equity 
capital. Columns 1, 2, and 3 only include the main effects of WORDS and LPIN while 
column 4 includes the main effects as well as the interaction effect of WORDS and LPIN. 
The main effect of WORDS is small and insignificant when interaction is not included in 
the model while the main effect of LPIN is nearly significant in the models excluding the 
interaction effect. Results in column 4 show a large significant effect of WORDS (coeff. = 
-0.055, p-value = 0.003) and a significant effect of LPIN (coeff. = 0.188, p-value = 
0.002). The interaction effect of WORDS and LPIN is also significant (coeff. = -0.027, p-




and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the probability of informed t ade. 
The Wald test statistics in column 4 are all significant. This indicates that the negative 
effect of WORDS is significantly different from the positive effect of LPIN on the cost of 
equity capital. Also, the negative association between the cost of equity capitaland the 
level of segment disclosures is increasing in probability of informed trade. Thus, the 
results using WORDS as a proxy of the level of segment disclosures are consistent with 
the results of Model 1.1 using SDSCORE as a proxy of the level of segment disclosures.  
---------- Insert Table 7 from Page 94 right about here ---------- 
 
5.2.2 Effect of managerial blockholdings on the association between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures 
 Table 8 provides the regression results for Model 2 examining the effect of 
managerial blockholdings on the association between the cost of equity capital and the
level of segment disclosures. Absence of managerial blockholdings is used as a proxy for 
the information asymmetry between the managers and the shareholders. It is expected 
that the negative association between the cost of capital and the level of segment 
disclosures will be more significant for the firms with no managerial blockh ldings 
(higher Type II information asymmetry). Such firms are expected to use disclosures as a 
remedial measure to reduce the moral hazard problem and information asymmetry that 
exists between managers of the firm and the investors. In other words, it is expected that 
the negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 




 Panel A of Table 8 shows the regression results for Model 2 using RAVG as a proxy 
for the implied cost of equity capital. Columns 1 and 2 include only the main effects of 
SDSCORE and NOBLOCK respectively. There is negative but insignificant effect of 
SDSCORE on the cost of equity capital in Column 1. The main effect of NOBLOCK in 
Column 2 is positive and significant as expected indicating that the firms with no 
managerial blockholdings have higher cost of equity capital because of higher Type II
information asymmetry. Column 3 includes the main effects of both SDSCORE and 
NOBLOCK but not the interaction effect. Results in Column 3 show a significant positive 
effect of the absence of managerial blockholdings on the cost of equity capital but the
negative effect of SDSCORE is not significant. Column 4 includes the interaction effect 
of SDSCORE and NOBLOCK along with the main effects. Results in Column 4 show a 
negative but insignificant association of the cost of equity capital with the level of 
segment disclosures. Absence of managerial blockholdings is positively (nearly 
significant) associated with the cost of equity capital. The coefficient on the interaction of 
SDSCORE and NOBLOCK is positive though insignificant. The Wald statistics are all 
insignificant. The Wald statistic for the summed coefficients (βNOBLOCK  + βSDSCORE * 
NOBLOCK) is negative and nearly significant (p-value = 0.116) indicating that the positive 
association between the cost of equity capital and the absence of  managerial 
blockholdings is decreasing in the level of segment disclosures indicating that hig er
level of segment disclosures help reduce the cost of equity capital for theirms with no 
managerial blockholdings as against the firms with managerial blockholdings. Comparing 




inclusion of the interaction term. Thus, Model 2 works as well without the interaction 
term as with the inclusion of the interaction term.  
 Panel B of Table 8 reports the results for Model 2 using alternative proxies of the 
cost of equity capital. All the results are similar to the results obtained using RAVG except 
the one using RGM as the proxy for the cost of equity capital. Model using RGM has a 
significant negative coefficient on the main effect of SDSCORE. Overall, the interaction 
effect of SDSCORE and NOBLOCK is not significant.  
---------- Insert Table 8 from Page 95 right about here ---------- 
 
5.2.3 Joint effect of probability of informed trade and managerial blockholding(s) 
on the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures 
 Next, the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures is studied in the joint presence of probability of informed trade and 
managerial blockholdings. It is expected that the firms with higher probability of 
informed trade (proxy for Type I information asymmetry) and no blockholdings (proxy 
for Type II information asymmetry) will have a stronger negative associati n between the 
cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures. Results of these analyses are 
reported in Table 9.  
 Panel A of Table 9 report results using RAVG as a measure of the implied cost of 
equity capital. Column 1 only includes the main effects of SDSCORE, LPIN, and 
NOBLOCK and the three-way interaction between the three. No two-way interactions are 




and NOBLOCK. All the three main effects have expected signs with only the effect of 
LPIN being significant at 10% level.  
 Column 2 in Panel A of Table 9 shows the regression results for an all 
encompassing model including the three main effects (SDSCORE, LPIN, and 
NOBLOCK), two two-way interactions (SDSCORE * LPIN, and SDSCORE * 
NOBLOCK), and one three-way interaction (SDSCORE * LPIN * NOBLOCK). All three 
main effects have the expected signs and are significant at 10% level with SDSCORE 
being of larger magnitude (coeff. = -0.083, p-value = 0.01). The two two-way 
interactions are also significant at 10% level with expected signs and are of 
approximately similar magnitude. These results confirm hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures is increasing in the probability of informed trade while the negativ  
association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosure is 
increasing in the absence of managerial blockholdings. The three-way interaction is not 
significant (p-value = 0.58) but has the expected negative. Insignificant three-way 
interaction indicates that the two types of information asymmetries do not affect the 
negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures jointly.  
 Results in Column 2 show an insignificant three-way interaction. Therefore, the 
three-way interaction between SDSCORE, LPIN, and NOBLOCK is dropped out in 
Model 3.3. Column 3 in Panel A of Table 9 shows the regression results for Model 3.3. 
Results are similar to the results presented in Column 2 for the encompassing Model 3.2. 




and bear the expected signs. Coefficient on SDSCORE (coeff. = -0.146, p-value = 0.002) 
has the largest magnitude among the three. Interaction between SDSCORE and LPIN is 
significant at the 1% level and bears the expected negative sign indicating tha the 
negative association between the implied cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosure is increasing in probability of informed trade. The coefficient on the 
interaction between SDSCORE and NOBLOCK is also significant at the 5% level and 
bears the expected negative sign indicating that the negative association between the 
implied cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosure is increasing in the 
absence of managerial blockholdings. A comparison of R2 in column 2 and 3 indicates 
that the model without the three-way interaction (column 3) works as well as the model 
including the three-way interaction (column 2). The R2 for both models is approximately 
40%. As a result, there is no evidence in favor of hypothesis 3. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the two information asymmetries affect the negative association between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures independently rather than jointly.  
 Panel B of Table 9 shows the results for Model 3.3 (excluding the three-way 
interaction) using the alternative proxies of the implied cost of equity capital. The results 
are consistent with the results in Panel A. The model using RGM as the proxy of the cost 
of equity capital provides the strongest results with a R2 of approximately 40%.  
---------- Insert Table 9 from Page 97 right about here ---------- 
A closer examination of the magnitude of the coefficients reveals that the 
increasing effect of the probability of informed trade dominates the effect of the absence 
of managerial blockholdings in both, Models 3.2 and 3.3. The Wald test statistics (not 




LPIN = βSDSCORE * NOBLOCK) is significant (p-value = 0.007) indicating that the interaction 
SDSCORE * LPIN (coeff. = -0.056) dominates the interaction SDSCORE * NOBLOCK 
(coeff. = 0.045). Also, the effect of Type II information asymmetry as measur d by 
absence of managerial blockholdings becomes significant only in presence of Type I 
information asymmetry as measured by the probability of informed trade. This evidence 
suggests that Type I information asymmetry is the dominant form of asymmetry and the 
investors demand higher returns in presence of Type I information asymmetry.  
Prior research suggests an entrenchment effect for the firms with higher 
managerial blockholdings (e.g. Claessens et al. 2002). To control for the entrenchment 
effect, a sensitivity analysis is done by classifying the sample firmsinto three groups- no 
managerial blockholdings, low managerial blockholdings, and high managerial 
blockholding. To do this two dummy variables are introduced in Model 2 replacing the 
variable NOBLOCK in Model 2. Dummy variable HBLOCK equals 1 if the total 
managerial blockholdings are greater than 30%. This group of sample firms corresponds 
to the firms with high managerial blockholdings. Similarly, dummy variable NOBLOCK 
equals 1 if there are no managerial blockholdings corresponding to the firms with no 
managerial blockholdings. As a result, default group consist of firms with low managerial 
blockholdings. It is expected that the firms with high managerial blockholdings or no 
blockholdings have higher x ante cost of equity capital as compared to firms with low 
blockholdings. Therefore, the negative association between the cost of equity capital and 
the level of segment disclosures will be stronger for such firms with high or no





Column 1 of Table 10 includes main effects of SDSCORE, HBLOCK, and 
NOBLOCK and the two two-way interactions (SDSCORE*HBLOCK and 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK). None of the main effects or the interaction effects is significant. 
Column 2 includes the main effects of SDSCORE, LPIN, HBLOCK, and NOBLOCK and 
the three two-way interactions (SDSCORE*LPIN, SDSCORE*HBLOCK and 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK). Main effects of SDSCORE, LPIN and NOBLOCK are 
significant at 5% level. Two-way interactions between SDSCORE and LPIN, and 
SDSCORE and NOBLOCK are both significant at 5% level. Column 3 shows results for 
the all encompassing model using main effects, two-way interactions and the three way 
interactions. None of the three way interactions are significant. Comparing adjusted R2 
for models shown in Column 2 and 3 indicates that the inclusion of three-way 
interactions do not add significant information to the model in Column 2. Overall results 
support the H1 and H2 as concluded previously.  
---------- Insert Table 10 from Page 99 right about here ---------- 
Overall, the evidence in support of H1 is the strongest in all the analyses. Mixed 
evidence is found in the support of H2. There was no significant evidence in support of 
H2 in the analyses presented in Table 8 where the probability of informed trade was not 
controlled for. However, significant evidence is found in support of H2 in the analyses 
reported in Table 9 and 10 when the probability of informed trade is controlled for. No 








The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between th  cost of 
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures of the US firms in the presence of two 
types of information asymmetry. Prior theory predicts a negative ssociation between the 
cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosure. This study, specifically, 
examines two situations under which the negative association between the cost of equity 
capital (ex ante) and the level of segment disclosures may be increasing or decreasing.  
The first situation predicts that the negative association between the cost ofequity 
capital and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the presence of i formation 
asymmetry among various types of shareholders/ investors. Informatin asymmetry 
existing among shareholders is proxied by the probability of informed trade. 
Alternatively, the positive association between the cost of equity capital and the 
probability of informed trade is decreasing in the level of segment disclosures. Evidence 
in the study supports this hypothesis. The interaction effect of LPIN and SDSCORE on 
the implied cost of equity capital is significantly negative indicating that the negative 
relation between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures is 
increasing in the probability of informed trade. The insignificant negative ssociation 




significant in the presence of probability of informed trade. There is a significant 
increasing effect of the probability of informed trade on the negative associ tion between 
the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures. Alternatively, h re is a 
significant decreasing effect of the level of segment disclosures on positive association 
between the cost of equity and the probability of informed trade. This is an interesting 
result, consistent with Botosan (1997) result, and provides an explanation to the mixed 
evidence found in prior research on the association between the cost of equity capital and 
the level of disclosures. Benefits of disclosing more segment information are significant 
for the firms whose x ante cost of equity capital is higher as a result of prevailing 
information asymmetries. Information asymmetry among different type of investors 
which results in private information based trading is a dominant form of information 
asymmetry.  
The second situation predicts that the negative association between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the absence of 
managerial blockholdings, a mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry between 
the managers and the shareholders. There is no conclusive evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Evidence do not support this hypothesis when the probability of informed 
trade (Type I information asymmetry) is not controlled for. But there is evidence in 
support of the hypothesis when the probability of informed trade is controlled for in the 
model. However, the three-way interaction of probability of informed trade, managerial 
blockholdings, and the level of segment disclosures is not significant (Hypothesis 3). 
Overall, this suggests that the managerial blockholdings help reduce the cost of equity 




shareholders. Also, the negative association between the cost of equity capital and the 
level of segment disclosures is increasing in the absence of manageril blockholdings 
when probability of informed trade is controlled for in the model. This finding suggests 
that the firms with higher information asymmetry, in general, use higher lev l of segment 
disclosures as a remedial measure to reduce the cost of equity capital. This is interesting 
evidence and needs to be explored further. In future research, it would be interesting to 
explore the association between the probability of informed trade and managerial 
ownership. There is a positive correlation between the two indicating that a firm with 
higher probability of informed trade have higher managerial ownership or vice versa.  
 This study uses the data of US firms. However, the results of this study are also 
applicable in the international setting. Firms reporting under International Accounting 
Standards use IFRS 8 of IASB to report their segment disclosure. Under the ongoing 
convergence project between the FASB and the IASB, the IASB has adopted SFAS # 131 
of FASB verbatim to report the segment disclosure under IFRS 8. Hence, the results of 
this study are extendable to firms who report segment information using IFRS 8.  
 One major contribution as well as a limitation of this study lies in the developed 
measure of the level of segment disclosures. It is a major contribution because no such 
detailed measure is yet available in the literature to measure the level of segment 
disclosures covering all the important aspects of segment information disclosed und r 
SFAS # 131. The limitation of this measure is that it involves some amount of 
subjectivity on the part of the researcher in awarding the scores to the firm-yeas. To 
overcome this limitation, most of the questions are Yes/ No type objective questions. 




which he/she deemed important to measure the level of segment disclosures. This may 
lead to a bias whereby some important aspects may have been left out while some other 
unimportant aspects may have been included in the measure. Also, this measure uses the 
same weight for all aspects which may not be the case because some aspects of segment 
information may be more important than others to the investors in evaluating the firm. 
Another limitation of this study is that it is limited to only one year of financi l data, 
namely year 2005.  
 The results of this study extend the literature on the relationship between the cost 
of equity capital and the level of segment disclosure. The results provide evidence in 
favor of the importance of segment disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital. It 
provides evidence that the existence of different types of information asymmetry affects 
the theoretical negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
segment disclosure. These results are extendable to the level of overall disclosure of the 
firm because segment disclosure, being a small yet important part of overall disclosure, 
has a significant effect on the implied cost of equity capital of the firm in presenc  of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, the results should be even stronger with the level of 
overall disclosure of the firm. 
 Overall, segment disclosures are an important part of the overall disclosure of the 
firm and are valued by the investors while evaluating a firm, especially in presence of 
information asymmetry. Also, the information asymmetry existing among different type 
of investors is a dominant form of information asymmetry affecting the association 
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 Question Scale 
 Operating (Primary) Segment Disclosures  
1. How may operating segments are used to 
report operating segment financial 
information? 
More than two (2); Two (1); 
Single segment (0) 
2 General information and description of 
operating segments? 
Maximum(2); Partial (1); None 
(0) 
3 Are sales, profit/loss, depreciation, and 
assets, as per Para 25 of SFAS 131, 
disclosed? 
Yes (2);  No (0) 
4 Disclosure of items (other than depreciation) 
included in measurement of profit/loss of 
operating segments as per Para 27 of SFAS 
131? 
Maximum(2); Partial (1); None 
(0) 
5 Does the firm disclose more than one 
measure of profit/ loss for the operating 
segments? 




6a*  Are there any material transactions between 
the reportable segments? 
Yes; No; Not disclosed 
6b Is the basis of accounting for any transaction 
between reportable segments disclosed? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
7 Disclosure of capital expenditures of 
operating segments? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
8 Is the reconciliation of reportable segments’ 
measures of profit/ loss to the enterprise’s 
consolidated income before income taxes, 
extraordinary income, discontinued 
operations, and the cumulative effect of 
changes in accounting principles shown? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
9 Is the reconciliation of reportable segments’ 
assets to the enterprise’s consolidated assets 
shown? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
10 Is the reconciliation of segment income and 
assets shown separately in detail (quality of 
reconciliation)? 
Yes, for both (2); Yes, for one 
only (1); No (0) 
11 Are liabilities of operating segments 
disclosed? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
12 Reconciliation of reportable segments’ 
liabilities (if disclosed) to the enterprise’s 
consolidated liabilities shown separately? 




13 Comparison of operating segment 
information with prior periods? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
14 Are there any other voluntarily disclosed 
items associated with operating segments? 
Two or more(2); One only (1); 
None (0) 
   
 Geographic  Disclosures  
15*  Are geographic segments also the operating 
segments? 
Yes; No 
16 Does the firm disclose geographic segments 
if it has foreign operations/subsidiaries? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
17 How many geographic segments are used to 
report the geographic information? Is it two 
segments (domestic vs. foreign) or is it more 
than two geographic segments reported? 
More than two segments for 
both assets and sales (2); more 
than two segments for sales 
(assets) and only two segments 
for assets (sales) (1); two 
segments for both sales and 
assets (0) 
18 Does the firm disclose the basis of allocation 
of sales to the geographic segments? 
(Disclosure of whether the geographic sales 
are based on country/region of shipment or 
country/region of destination?) 
Yes (2); No (0) 




attributed to enterprise’s country of domicile 
and attributed to all foreign countries/ regions 
in total, reported? 
20 Are long-lived assets, located in country of 
domicile and those located in all foreign 
countries/ regions in total, reported? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
21 Is foreign financial data reported at country 
level or regional level? 
Yes, all of it at country level 
(2); Yes, at regional/country 
level mixed; No (0) 
22 Is profit/ loss metric disclosed for geographic 
segments? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
23 Is geographic segment information compared 
to prior period? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
24  Other voluntarily disclosed items about 
geographic segments? 
 Two or more (2); One only 
(1); None (0) 
   
 Other Disclosures  
25a Is the name of major customer disclosed in 
the customer revenue information? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
25b**  Are there any other disclosures associated 
with customer revenue or profit/loss? 
Yes (1); No (0) 
26 Consistency of segmentation used in business 
summary section and segmentation used for 




segment disclosures in notes as per SFAS 
131? 
27 Consistency of segmentation used in MD & 
A section and segmentation used for segment 
disclosures in notes as per SFAS 131? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
28 Are revenues from external customers for 
each product and service reported if operating 
segments are not based on products?  
Yes (2); No (0) 
29 Are there any other voluntarily disclosed 
items associated with segments based on 
products/services? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
30 Does the firm provide an attestation that a 
similar format of segment information is used 
internally for management purposes? 
Yes(2); No (0) 
31 Is there any other type of segment 
information disclosed apart from operating 
and geographic segments? 
Yes (2); No (0) 
 
* No score is awarded on questions 6a and 15. 
** Maximum score on question 25b is 1 only. Most of the firms only provide the amount of 
revenue (as dollar amount or percentage of total revenue) from major customers without 





The total of scores on all the questions is the total score (TSCORE) for level of 
segmental disclosures for the respective firm-year. An index of segment disclosure score 
(SDSCORE) is calculated by scaling the TSCORE of the firms by number of question on 
which a particular firm is evaluated. Firms with foreign operations (whether they provide 
geographic segment disclosures or not) and with significant transactions between 
operating segments are evaluated on a total 31 questions, namely, questions 1-31. And 
therefore, SDSCORE for these firms equals TSCORE/ 31. Firms with foreign operations 
but no significant transactions between operating segments are evaluated on a total of 30 
questions, namely, questions 1-5 and 7-31. Thus, SDSCORE for such firms equals 
TSCORE/ 30. Firms with no foreign operations but with significant transactions between 
operating segments are evaluated on a total of 21 questions, namely, questions 1-14 and 
25-31. Hence, SDSCORE for such firms equals TSCORE/ 21. Firms with no foreign 
operations and no significant transactions between operating segments are evaluated on a 
total of 20 questions. Hence, SDSCORE for such firms equals TSCORE/ 20. Firms with 
no SFAS 131 segment disclosures have a SDSCORE = 0. Data is windsorized at 1 
percent and 99 percent level for the variable SDSCORE.  This scaled score for the level 
of segment disclosures (SDSCORE) is used as a proxy for the level of segment 
disclosures in the analysis.  
 
Assessment of validity of SDSCORE 
Botosan (1997) demonstrates that disclosure index of financial disclosures is a 
useful research tool. Similarly, an index of segment disclosures can become an i portant 




effect on cost of equity capital in presence of information asymmetry. However, the 
development and application of such index requires subjective assessments by the 
researcher. Therefore, most of the questions used in the development of index are Yes/
No type questions to maximize the objectivity of the index. But the presence of some 
amount of subjectivity requires us to assess the validity of the resulting measure 
(SDSCORE).  
 Following Botosan (1997), I expect the measure of the level of segment 
disclosures to be positively correlated with size and leverage of the firm, and the numb r 
of analysts following the firm. Larger firms are expected to provide higher lev l of 
disclosures. Firms with higher amount of debt in their capital structure are expected to 
maintain a higher level of disclosures as compared to firms with low or no debt because 
disclosures help firms reduce the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998). Similarly, firms with 
better disclosures have higher analyst following. Table A-1 presents the correlati n 
coefficients between measure of segment disclosures (SDSCORE) and firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEVERAGE), and number of analysts following the firm (ANALYSTS). Using 
the Spearman correlation coefficients, results in Table A-1 show a positive and 
significant correlation of SDSCORE with firm size, leverage, and number of analysts 
following the firm. Correlation of SDSCORE with firm size and leverage is significant at 
1% level while correlation of SDSCORE with number of analyst following is significant 
at 5% level. Pearson correlation coefficients also show a positive correlatin of 
SDINDEX with firm size, leverage, and number of analysts. But the correlation 
coefficient between SDSCORE and leverage is not significant at 10% level while other 




 Panel B of Table A-1 also presents the results of regression of SDSCORE on three 
firm level characteristics - firm size, leverage, and number of analysts following the firm. 
Results show that firm size, leverage, and analyst following continue to be positively 
associated with the level of segment disclosures and explain approximately 13 percent 
variation in SDSCORE. Coefficient on firm size is significant at 5% level. 
---------- Insert Table A-1 from Page 84 right about here -------- 
A second analysis is used to assess the validity of SDSCORE. Specifically, I look 
at the correlation between SDSCORE and disclosure quality measure based on 
disaggregation of segment information (DISAGG), as defined earlier in Chapter IV. Bens 
and Monahan (2004) conclude that DISAGG is positively correlated with AIMR 
disclosure rankings and works as a good measure of disclosure quality. Table A-2 
presents the correlation coefficients (Pearson and Spearman) between SDSCORE and 
DISAGG. Results show a positive, strong, and significant correlation between SDSCORE 
and DISAGG. All the correlations (both Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation) are 
significant at 1% significance level.  
---------- Insert Table A-2 from Page 85 right about here -------- 
 A third analysis looks at the correlation of SDSCORE with the natural log of 
number of words used in SFAS # 131 disclosure of the firm. Natural log of number of 
words is termed as WORDS. Table A-2 presents the correlation coefficients between 
SDSCORE and WORDS.  Results show a positive, strong, and significant correlation 
between the two measures of the level of segment disclosure. This is an interesting result 




number of words used in disclosures can serve as a good proxy for the level of 
disclosures.  






























Figure 1. Trading process for EKO model. α is the probability of information event, δ is probability of bad news signal, (1-δ) is the probability of good news 
signal, µ is the daily arrival rate of uninformed trade, εb is the daily arrival rate of uninformed buy orders, and εs is the daily arrival rate of uninformed sell orders. 
Nodes to left of dotted line occur once per day and the trades to the right of line occur continuously throughout the day. 
Buy arrival rate, εb 
Sell arrival rate, εs  
Information event 
does not occur, (1- α) 
Good news signal, 
(1-δ) 
Continuously throughout the day 
Buy arrival rate, εb 
Bad news signal, δ
Once per day 
Sell arrival rate, εs  
Sell arrival rate, εs + µ 
Information event 







Table A-1. Analyzing SDSCORE against variables – SIZE, LEV and # ANALYSTS  
 
PANEL A: Correlation analyses 
 SDSCORE SIZE LEV # ANALYSTS  
SDSCORE  0.384***  0.076 0.300**   
SIZE 0.411***   -0.068 0.717***   
LEV 0.288***  0.160  -0.087  
# ANALYSTS 0.270**  0.745***  0.170   
PANEL B: Regression analyses 
 INTERCEPT SIZE LEV # ANALYSTS Adj-R2 
SDSCORE 0.209 0.083**  0.113 0.003 0.128 
SDSCORE 0.162 0.093***  0.110  0.137 
In Panel A, entries above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations and entries below 
represent Spearman correlations.  
*** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, r spectively based on two-















Table A-2. Correlation analyses between SDSCORE, DISAGG, and WORDS 
 
 SDSCORE DISAGG WORDS 
SDSCORE  0.512***  0.816***  
DISAGG 0.467***   0.464***  
WORDS 0.829***  0.351***   
Entries above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations and entries 
below represent Spearman correlations.  
*** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, r spectively 





















Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N    Mean Std. Dev.       5%      25%      50%      75%      95% 
RAVG 84 0.101 0.029 0.066 0.082 0.095 0.112 0.153 
RGLS 84 0.083 0.022 0.054 0.067 0.081 0.095 0.119 
RGM 84 0.113 0.041 0.070 0.092 0.106 0.126 0.189 
RCT 84 0.090 0.032 0.053 0.070 0.084 0.103 0.137 
RPEG 84 0.119 0.043 0.064 0.089 0.110 0.137 0.205 
SDSCORE 84 0.830 0.315 0.355 0.581 0.935 1.048 1.226 
DISAGG 84 1.384 0.783 0.000 0.916 1.386 1.946 2.485 
WORDS 84 6.261 1.031 4.419 6.051 6.485 6.807 7.296 
PIN 84 0.143 0.067 0.053 0.094 0.129 0.173 0.299 
LPIN 84 -2.048 0.463 -2.940 -2.368 -2.045 -1.756 -1.206 
SIZE 84 6.925 1.323 4.929 5.976 6.898 7.844 9.033 
ROA 84 0.075 0.071 -0.006 0.038 0.062 0.108 0.180 
BETA 84 1.434 0.540 0.506 1.134 1.469 1.728 2.277 
LBM 84 -1.008 0.471 -1.850 -1.253 -0.964 -0.703 -0.201 
SG 84 0.228 0.190 0.020 0.112 0.172 0.287 0.585 
LEV 84 0.228 0.293 0.000 0.019 0.152 0.311 0.884 
STDRET 84 -3.643 0.319 -4.097 -3.878 -3.703 -3.433 -3.080 
# ANALYSTS 84 8.202 6.987 1 3 6 11 23 
FOLLOW=1 46 0.548 0.501 - - - - - 
NOBLOCK=1 56 0.667 0.474 - - - - - 




RGLS, RGM, RCT, and RPEG are the measures of implied cost of equity capital based on GLS (2001), GM 
(2003), CT (2001), and Easton (2004) models. RAVG is the average measure of implied cost of equity equal 
to the arithmetic mean of RGLS, RGM, RCT, and RPEG. SDSCORE is the scaled rank measure of the level of 
segment disclosures based on a hand developed measure of the level of segment disclosures. DISAGG is 
the measure of disaggregation of the segment information used as a proxy for the level of segment 
disclosures based on Berger and Hann (2003) and Bens and Monahan (2004). Variable WORDS is the 
measure of the level of segment disclosures based on number of words disclosed under SFAS # 131 
disclosures. PIN is the measure of probability of informed trade based on the EKO (1997) model. LPIN is 
the natural log of the PIN. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of firm. ROA is calculated as income 
before extraordinary items scaled by total assets of the firm. BETA is the measure of market risk calculated 
from market model using daily returns over the 12 month period. LBM is ratio of book value to market 
value of equity. SG is a measure of sales growth calculated as the mean of sales growth during past two 
years. LEV is a measure of firm leverage calculated as a ratio of debt to market value of equity. STDRET is 
a measure of volatility of stock returns calculated as the natural log of mean of the annual standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over a period of five years. # ANALYSTS is the number of analysts 
following a firm during the fiscal year. FOLLOW = 1 if the number of analysts is greater than or equal to 
median number of analysts following the sample firms. NOBLOCK = 1 if the firm has no managerial 





































Table 2. Pearson and Spearman correlations among different estimates of implied 
cost of equity capital  
 
 RAVG RGLS RGM RCT RPEG 
RAVG  0.661
***  0.887***  0.902***  0.846***  
RGLS 0.628
***   0.465***  0.613***  0.373***  
RGM 0.852
***  0.412***   0.758***  0.640***  
RCT 0.906
***  0.597***  0.775***   0.656***  
RPEG 0.811
***  0.367***  0.539***  0.658***   
Entries above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations and entries below represent 
Spearman correlations.  
*** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively 









































































            
LPIN  -0.481***  -0.137 -0.129 0.268**  -0.179  0.104 -0.306***  -0.008 -0.101  0.292***  
SIZE -0.436***   -0.022  0.009 -0.214**  -0.113 -0.068  0.642***  -0.462***   0.384***  -0.380***  
ROA -0.142  0.064  -0.129 -0.311***   0.242**  -0.548***  -0.197*  -0.118 -0.050 -0.043 
BETA -0.077 -0.105 -0.087  -0.192*   0.108  0.032  0.013  0.317***  -0.224**  -0.126 
LBM  0.235**  -0.237**  -0.331***   0.072  -0.044 -0.178 -0.052 -0.214*  -0.023  0.118 
SG -0.221**  -0.115  0.396***   0.191*  -0.150  -0.103 -0.231**   0.252**  -0.081 -0.020 
LEV  0.011  0.160*  -0.522***  -0.048  0.043 -0.121  -0.084  0.168  0.076 -0.010 
FOLLOW -0.318***   0.664***  -0.181*  -0.059 -0.051 -0.227**   0.277**   -0.210*   0.178 -0.321***  
STDRET -0.001 -0.492***  -0.226**   0.358***  -0.082  0.275**  -0.041 -0.296***   -0.297***   0.178 
SDSCORE -0.109  0.411***  -0.081 -0.222**  -0.057 -0.141  0.288***   0.270**  -0.286***   -0.171 







Entries above the diagonal represent Pearson correlations and entries below it represent Spearman correlations; *** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 







Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients of explanatory variables with implied cost 
of equity capital 
 RAVG RGLS RGM RCT RPEG 
SDSCORE -0.119  0.037 -0.115 -0.067 -0.182*  
DISAGG -0.158  0.093 -0.125 -0.186*  -0.219**  
WORDS -0.145  0.068 -0.139 -0.084 -0.233**  
LPIN  0.289***   0.141  0.179  0.253**   0.350***  
NOBLOCK -0.089 -0.132 -0.174 -0.023  0.011 
SIZE -0.294***  -0.175 -0.120 -0.362***  -0.322***  
ROA -0.349***  -0.272**  -0.246**  -0.178 -0.437***  
BETA  0.227**   0.228**   0.215**   0.093  0.222**  
LBM  0.171  0.278***   0.036  0.202*   0.137 
SG  0.060  0.091  0.110  0.093 -0.061 
LEV  0.348***   0.096  0.331***   0.250**   0.391***  
FOLLOW -0.161 -0.221**  -0.081 -0.280***  -0.036 
STDRET  0.307***   0.122  0.256**   0.212*   0.367***  







Table 5. Effect of SDSCORE, LPIN, and (SDSCORE*LPIN) on the implied cost of 
equity capital: Model (1.1) OLS estimates of regression coefficients 
 











Intercept   0.405 (0.000)***   0.394 (0.000)***   0.401(0.000)***   0.446 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-) -0.001 (0.700)  0.001 (0.874)  0.001 (0.798)  0.001 (0.877) 
ROA (-) -0.057 (0.368) -0.043 (0.485) -0.045 (0.476) -0.047 (0.446) 
BETA (+)  0.009 (0.115)  0.010 (0.070)*   0.010 (0.094)*   0.009 (0.095)*  
LBM (+)  0.015 (0.084)*   0.014 (0.087)*   0.014 (0.088)*   0.014 (0.094)*  
SG (?)  0.004 (0.792)  0.009 (0.592)  0.009 (0.593)  0.009 (0.551) 
LEV (+)  0.025 (0.076)*   0.025 (0.072)*   0.025 (0.070)*   0.027 (0.050)**  
FOLLOW (-) -0.008 (0.328) -0.006 (0.388) -0.007 (0.368) -0.005 (0.471) 
STDRET (+)  0.012 (0.330)  0.017 (0.175)  0.016 (0.188)  0.017 (0.175) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.030)**  -0.001 (0.053)*  -0.001 (0.050)**  -0.001 (0.090)*  
SDSCORE (-) -0.004 (0.723)  -0.004 (0.707) -0.086 (0.047)** 
LPIN (+)   0.012 (0.109)  0.012 (0.110)  0.049 (0.017)** 
SDSCORE*LPIN (-)    -0.041 (0.051)* 
Adj- R2 (N = 84) 0.278 0.302  0.294  0.322 
 Wald test of βSDSCORE = βLPIN 0.008 (0.212)  0.037 (0.031)** 
 Wald test of βSDSCORE + βSDSCORE * LPIN 
Wald test of βLPIN  + βSDSCORE * LPIN 
-0.127 (0.137) 




Panel B. OLS estimates of regression coefficients for Model (1.1) using alternative estimates of the 
implied cost of equity capital 
 R = RGLS 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RGM 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RCT 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RPEG 
Coeff. (p-value) 
Intercept   0.147 (0.128)  0.742 (0.000)***   0.411 (0.003)***   0.484 (0.004)***  
SIZE (-)  0.001 (0.779)  0.008 (0.161) -0.003 (0.526) -0.004 (0.517) 
ROA (-) -0.052 (0.319) -0.030 (0.740)  0.009 (0.904) -0.115 (0.191) 
BETA (+)  0.011 (0.022)**   0.009 (0.275)  0.006 (0.357)  0.012 (0.149) 
LBM (+)  0.014 (0.045)**   0.014 (0.255)  0.017 (0.075)*   0.010 (0.388) 
SG (?)  0.008 (0.551)  0.024 (0.310)  0.008(0.661) -0.002 (0.928) 
LEV (+)  0.005 (0.645)  0.041 (0.040)**   0.029 (0.074)*   0.031 (0.100)*  
FOLLOW (-) -0.011 (0.078)*  -0.010 (0.351) -0.011 (0.223)  0.011 (0.311) 
STDRET (+)  0.005 (0.643)  0.023 (0.196)  0.007 (0.645)  0.032 (0.069)*  
INDUSTRY (?) -0.000 (0.947) -0.001 (0.011)**  -0.001 (0.106) -0.000 (0.473) 
SDSCORE (-) -0.040 (0.270) -0.170 (0.008)*** -0.054 (0.293) -0.082 (0.182) 
LPIN (+)  0.024 (0.154)  0.085 (0.005)***  0.030 (0.218)  0.057 (0.049)** 
SDSCORE*LPIN (-) -0.025 (0.160) -0.075 (0.015)** -0.028 (0.257) -0.036 (0.224) 
Adj- R2 (N = 84)  0.170  0.284  0.192  0.367 
Wald test of βSDSCORE 
+ βSDSCORE * LPIN 
-0.065 (0.182) -0.245 (0.024)** -0.082 (0.510) -0.118 (0.382) 
Wald test of βLPIN      
+ βSDSCORE * LPIN 
-0.001 (0.351)  0.010 (0.017)**  0.002 (0.466)  0.021 (0.031)** 





Table 6. Effect of DISAGG, LPIN, and (DISAGG*LPIN) on the implied cost of 
equity capital: Model (1.2) OLS estimates of regression coefficients 









Intercept   0.406 (0.000)***   0.394 (0.000)***   0.402 (0.000)***   0.401 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-) -0.001 (0.695)  0.001 (0.874)  0.001 (0.800)  0.001 (0.791) 
ROA (-) -0.059 (0.350) -0.043 (0.485) -0.047 (0.455) -0.051 (0.425) 
BETA (+)  0.010 (0.091)*   0.010 (0.070)*   0.010 (0.073)*   0.010 (0.072)*  
LBM (+)  0.014 (0.093)*   0.014 (0.087)*   0.014 (0.099)*   0.014 (0.106) 
SG (?)  0.005 (0.779)  0.009 (0.592)  0.009 (0.582)  0.010 (0.542) 
LEV (+)  0.023 (0.110)  0.025 (0.071)*   0.023 (0.104)  0.022 (0.130) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.007 (0.333) -0.006 (0.388) -0.007 (0.375) -0.006 (0.416) 
STDRET (+)  0.012 (0.308)  0.017 (0.175)  0.017 (0.173)  0.017 (0.187) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.029)**  -0.001 (0.053)**  -0.001 (0.049)*  -0.001 (0.069)*  
DISAGG (-) -0.002 (0.646)  -0.002 (0.641) -0.010 (0.572) 
LPIN (+)   0.012 (0.109)  0.011 (0.111)  0.018 (0.234) 
DISASS*LPIN (-)    -0.004 (0.632) 
Adj- R2 (N = 84)  0.279  0.302  0.295  0.287 
 Wald test of βDISAGG = βLPIN 0.009 (0.104)  0.008 (0.378) 
 Wald test of βDISAGG + βDISAGG * LPIN 
Wald test of βLPIN  + βDISAGG * LPIN 
-0.014 (0.800) 
 0.014 (0.252) 




Table 7. Effect of WORDS, LPIN, and (WORDS*LPIN) on the implied cost of equity 
capital: Model (1.3) OLS estimates of regression coefficients 











Intercept   0.415 (0.000)***   0.394 (0.000)***   0.409 (0.000)***   0.732 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-) -0.001 (0.736)  0.001 (0.874)  0.001 (0.773)  0.000 (0.926) 
ROA (-) -0.056 (0.376) -0.043 (0.485) -0.044 (0.485) -0.024 (0.688) 
BETA (+)  0.009 (0.133)  0.010 (0.070)*   0.009 (0.107)  0.011 (0.052)*  
LBM (+)  0.015 (0.078)*   0.014 (0.087)*   0.014 (0.083)*   0.015 (0.059) 
SG (?)  0.005 (0.737)  0.009 (0.592)  0.010 (0.550)  0.013 (0.408) 
LEV (+)  0.025 (0.074)*   0.025 (0.072)*   0.025 (0.069)*   0.030 (0.022)**  
FOLLOW (-) -0.007 (0.332) -0.006 (0.386) -0.007 (0.375) -0.004 (0.543) 
STDRET (+)  0.013 (0.314)  0.017 (0.175)  0.017 (0.178)  0.019 (0.111) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.028)**  -0.001 (0.053)*  -0.001 (0.048)**  -0.001 (0.077)*  
WORDS(-)  -0.002 (0.542)  -0.002 (0.561) -0.055 (0.003)*** 
LPIN (+)   0.012 (0.109)  0.012 (0.113)  0.188 (0.002)*** 
WORDS*LPIN (-)    -0.027 (0.003)*** 
Adj- R2 (N = 84)  0.281  0.302  0.296  0.368 
 Wald test of βWORDS = βLPIN 0.010 (0.090)  0.133 (0.002)*** 
 Wald test of βWORDS + βWORDS * LPIN 
Wald test of βLPIN  + βWORDS * LPIN 
-0.082 (0.011)** 
 0.161 (0.004)*** 




Table 8. Effect of SDSCORE, NOBLOCK, and (SDSCORE*NOBLOCK) on the 
implied cost of equity capital: Model (2) OLS estimates of regression coefficients 











Intercept   0.405 (0.000)***   0.381 (0.000)***   0.390 (0.000)***   0.390 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-) -0.001 (0.700) -0.002 (0.466) -0.002 (0.573) -0.002 (0.552) 
ROA (-) -0.057 (0.368) -0.046 (0.455) -0.047 (0.445) -0.061 (0.338) 
BETA (+)  0.009 (0.115)  0.008 (0.129)  0.008 (0.171)  0.008 (0.168) 
LBM (+)   0.015 (0.084)*   0.016 (0.054)*   0.016 (0.055)*   0.014 (0.110) 
SG (?)  0.004 (0.792)  0.001 (0.967)  0.001 (0.969)  0.004 (0.802) 
LEV (+)  0.025 (0.076)*   0.026 (0.058)*   0.026 (0.056)*   0.020 (0.175) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.008 (0.328) -0.009 (0.230) -0.009 (0.214) -0.010 (0.183) 
STDRET (+)  0.012 (0.330)  0.015 (0.201)  0.015 (0.217)  0.013 (0.273) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.030)**  -0.001 (0.057)*  -0.001 (0.052)*  -0.001 (0.040)**  
SDSCORE (-) -0.004 (0.723)  -0.004 (0.653)  0.011 (0.564) 
NOBLOCK (+)   0.012 (0.066)*  0.012 (0.065)*  0.028 (0.122) 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK  
(-) 
   -0.021 (0.336) 
 









 Wald test of βSDSCORE = βNOBLOCK  0.008 (0.177)  0.017 (0.149) 
 Wald test of βSDSCORE + βSDSCORE * NOBLOCK 
Wald test of βNOBLOCK  + βSDSCORE * NOBLOCK 
-0.010 (0.568) 




Panel B. OLS estimates of regression coefficients for Model (2) using alternative estimates of the 
implied cost of equity capital 
 R = RGLS 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RGM 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RCT 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RPEG 
Coeff. (p-value) 
Intercept   0.106 (0.254)  0.642 (0.000)***   0.367 (0.007)***   0.443 (0.009)***  
SIZE (-)  0.000 (0.948)  0.004 (0.442) -0.004 (0.317) -0.009 (0.103) 
ROA (-) -0.045 (0.391) -0.054 (0.563) -0.002 (0.981) -0.144 (0.125) 
BETA (+)  0.010 (0.037)**   0.007 (0.420)  0.005 (0.452)  0.010 (0.234) 
LBM (+)  0.015 (0.031)**   0.013 (0.303)  0.017 (0.099)*   0.010 (0.415) 
SG (?)  0.004 (0.782)  0.017 (0.483)  0.007 (0.713) -0.011 (0.639) 
LEV (+)  0.005 (0.675)  0.028 (0.195)  0.022 (0.208)  0.026 (0.241) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.014 (0.028)**  -0.018 (0.109) -0.015 (0.096)*   0.006 (0.576) 
STDRET (+)  0.007 (0.510)  0.018 (0.310)  0.006 (0.673)  0.023 (0.203) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.000 (0.958) -0.001 (0.003)***  -0.001 (0.070)*  -0.001 (0.249) 
SDSCORE (-)  0.009 (0.359) -0.031 (0.076)* -0.005 (0.693) -0.014 (0.397) 
NOBLOCK (+)  0.011 (0.443)  0.049 (0.069)*  0.031 (0.144)  0.021 (0.422) 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK  
(-) 
-0.001 (0.951) -0.040 (0.219) -0.026 (0.316) -0.018 (0.576) 
 
















Table 9. Effect of SDSCORE, LPIN, NOBLOCK, (SDSCORE*LPIN), 
(SDSCORE*NOBLOCK), and (SDSCORE*LPIN*NOBLOCK) on the implied cost of 
equity capital: Model (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) OLS estimates of regression coefficients  









Intercept   0.384 (0.001)***   0.451 (0.000)***   0.447 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-)  0.001 (0.836)  0.000 (0.931)  0.000 (0.975) 
ROA (-) -0.029 (0.642) -0.061 (0.309) -0.062 (0.301) 
BETA (+)  0.008 (0.143)  0.008 (0.124)  0.008 (0.142) 
LBM (+)  0.016 (0.055)*   0.010 (0.195)  0.010 (0.199) 
SG (?)  0.005 (0.760)  0.015 (0.336)  0.014 (0.355) 
LEV (+)  0.028 (0.053)*   0.016 (0.248)  0.016 (0.237) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.009 (0.244) -0.009 (0.225) -0.009 (0.218) 
STDRET (+)  0.021 (0.090)*   0.019 (0.112)  0.019 (0.105) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.109) -0.000 (0.119) -0.000 (0.133) 
SDSCORE (-) -0.007 (0.627) -0.083 (0.010)* -0.146 (0.002)*** 
LPIN (+)  0.016 (0.094)*  0.073 (0.000)***  0.074 (0.000)*** 
NOBLOCK (+)  0.011 (0.401)  0.053 (0.005)***  0.053 (0.004)*** 
SDSCORE*LPIN (-)  -0.055 (0.036)** -0.063 (0.003)*** 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK (-)  -0.065 (0.094)* -0.047 (0.031)** 
SDSCORE*LPIN*NOBLOCK 
(-) 
-0.002 (0.823) -0.009 (0.585)  




Panel B. OLS estimates of regression coefficients for Model (3.3) using alternative estimates of the 
implied cost of equity capital 
 R = RGLS 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RGM 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RCT 
Coeff. (p-value) 
R = RPEG 
Coeff. (p-value) 
Intercept   0.140 (0.137)  0.748 (0.000)***   0.414 (0.003)***   0.486 (0.003)***  
SIZE (-)  0.001 (0.847)  0.007 (0.168) -0.003 (0.456) -0.004 (0.465) 
ROA (-) -0.049 (0.345) -0.060 (0.477) -0.006 (0.931) -0.131 (0.144) 
BETA (+)  0.010 (0.038)**   0.006 (0.393)  0.005 (0.465)  0.010 (0.197) 
LBM (+)  0.014 (0.053)*   0.007 (0.541)  0.014 (0.158)  0.007 (0.585) 
SG (?)  0.008 (0.567)  0.033 (0.133)  0.013 (0.490)  0.003 (0.896) 
LEV (+)  0.003 (0.794)  0.022 (0.271)  0.019 (0.267)  0.022 (0.297) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.013 (0.034)**  -0.016 (0.122) -0.014 (0.116)  0.008 (0.456) 
STDRET (+)  0.008 (0.432)  0.026 (0.117)  0.009 (0.553)  0.033 (0.058)*  
INDUSTRY (?)  0.000 (0.777) -0.001 (0.013)**  -0.001 (0.145) -0.000 (0.561) 
SDSCORE (-) -0.051 (0.158) -0.188 (0.002)*** -0.065 (0.203) -0.091 (0.135) 
LPIN (+)  0.036 (0.048)**  0.127 (0.000)***  0.052 (0.043)**  0.079 (0.012)** 
NOBLOCK (+)  0.024 (0.138)  0.092 (0.000)***  0.049 (0.033)**  0.048 (0.079)* 
SDSCORE*LPIN (-) -0.035 (0.061)* -0.114 (0.000)*** -0.049 (0.064)* -0.056 (0.075)* 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK 
(-) 
-0.014 (0.445) -0.086 (0.007)*** -0.045 (0.098)* -0.045 (0.168) 
Adj- R2 (N = 84)  0.215  0.401  0.236  0.384 







Table 10. Sensitivity test using dummy variables for high and no managerial blocks 








Intercept   0.396 (0.001)***   0.452 (0.000)***   0.505 (0.000)***  
SIZE (-) -0.002 (0.560)  0.000 (0.981)  0.001 (0.891) 
ROA (-) -0.070 (0.316) -0.068 (0.295) -0.077 (0.237) 
BETA (+)  0.008 (0.196)  0.008 (0.166)  0.007 (0.236) 
LBM (+)  0.014 (0.122)  0.010 (0.213)  0.008 (0.305) 
SG (?)  0.005 (0.751)  0.015 (0.339)  0.015 (0.340) 
LEV (+)  0.019 (0.231)  0.015 (0.296)  0.012 (0.426) 
FOLLOW (-) -0.010 (0.184) -0.009 (0.219) -0.011 (0.138) 
STDRET (+)  0.013 (0.306)  0.019 (0.125)  0.019 (0.112) 
INDUSTRY (?) -0.001 (0.039)**  -0.000 (0.130) -0.001 (0.054)*  
SDSCORE (-)  0.010 (0.617) -0.010 (0.019)** -0.106 (0.046)** 
HBLOCK (+)  0.004 (0.921)  0.002 (0.948)  0.004 (0.898) 
NOBLOCK (+)  0.029 (0.132)  0.054 (0.007)***  0.056 (0.005)*** 
SDSCORE*HBLOCK (-)  0.001 (0.976)  0.002 (0.964)  0.097 (0.193) 
SDSCORE*NOBLOCK  (-) -0.021 (0.370) -0.047 (0.043)** -0.041 (0.323) 
LPIN (+)  0.074 (0.000)***  0.072 (0.001)*** 
SDSCORE*LPIN  -0.063 (0.004)*** -0.068 (0.015)** 
SDSCORE*LPIN*HBLOCK (+ )    0.053 (0.129) 
SDSCORE*LPIN*NOBLOCK (- )    0.005 (0.791) 
Adj- R2 (N = 84)  0.283  0.387  0.392 
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Scope and Method of Study:  
 
 
Using the ex ante measures of the cost of equity capital and a hand-developed 
index measure of the level of segment disclosures, this study examines the theoretical 
negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosure in presence of the probability of informed trade and the managerial 




Findings and Conclusions:   
 
 
This study finds that the theoretical negative association between the cost of
equity capital and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the existing probability 
of informed trade. This study also finds mixed evidence in support of the contention that 
the negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment 
disclosures is increasing in the absence of managerial blockholdings. Further, the 
increasing effect of probability of informed trade dominates the effect of managerial 
blockholdings on the association between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
segment disclosure. Overall, the evidence suggests that the negative association between 
the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosures is increasing in the 
probability of informed trade and the absence of managerial blockholdings. 
